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America’s founding fathers identified education as the key for sustaining
democracy and economic growth. When determining how the new country would
organize education, they decided not to centralize higher education institutions under a
national university, thus creating a federalist system unique from the European model.
This format allowed for diversity in educational missions, which many theorists suggest
allows the country to serve its heterogeneous population. Many institutions that focus on
social equity do not perform as high as institutions with selective admissions criteria. As
governments begin enforcing accountability policies that encourage performance,
institutions with social equity missions may be adversely affected. Furthermore, higher
education leaders fear that the focus on performance downplays the role of educational
effectiveness.
This research developed an Educational Performance Index (EPI)—a tool that
combines measures of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity—to serve as an evaluation
instrument for higher education institutions. The results of the study indicated that social
equity related missions do have a negative relationship to traditional efficiency metrics;

however, the composite EPI was not influenced by institutional characteristics, such as
Carnegie Classification and attributes indicative of social equity missions. By controlling
for these mission-related features, institutional performance can be measured more
comprehensively. A third hypothesis compared the EPI scores to those of traditional
academic rankings to test whether the EPI was similar to existing measures. This
hypothesis was partially supported, but it also excluded nearly half of the institutions in
the study because they did not have regional rankings.
Through an exploration of the literature, this study asserts that the way higher
education is measured has consequences in how institutions fulfill their missions. Current
performance measures both in terms of graduation rates and in terms of academic
rankings promote social inequity. The conclusions of this study presents an alternative
instrument that provides an accountability mechanism that does not disincentivize
institutions from serving the public good.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
America’s founding fathers identified education as the key for sustaining
democracy and economic growth (e.g., Jefferson, 1779). When determining how the new
country would organize a higher education system, the founding fathers decided not to
centralize institutions under a national university. Several, including George Washington,
supported the concept of a national university—one that would have common
competencies and primary authority belonging to the federal government (Harris, 2013).
Ultimately, the voices of other notable scholars and political figures convinced those
present at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia that higher education
needed to remain decentralized under the states’ authority because the states within the
union were different from one another and had distinctive needs (Harris, 2013; Newbold,
2010).
The deliberate omission of education from the U.S. Constitution signaled a
departure from the traditional European model of national education and shaped the
framework of America’s distinctive higher education system (Barton, 2010; Harris,
2013). The lack of a federal oversight allowed for institutional diversification or
“institution building” (Harris, 2013, p. 23) with the freedom to establish autonomously.
Many religious institutions had already been established by this time, but many states
began to form their own public education systems. Morphew (2002) explained that “[t]he
1

existence of postsecondary institution with unique and differentiated missions serves
states’ needs by improving efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 209).
Although colleges and universities were established with common goals to educate
citizens and to support the American and global economy, they were free to determine
how best they would accomplish these goals and which students they would serve.
Today, the U.S. higher education system represents the most institutional diversification
in the world, including colleges and universities categorized as vocational, two-year or
community, liberal arts, women’s, historically black serving, tribal, religious, research,
professional, proprietary, doctoral, and comprehensive. Such diversity provides
overlapping services that offer multiple avenues for the United States’ heterogeneous
population to attain college education.
Institutional Diversity with Respect for Social Equity
Since its founding, the United States has grappled with applications of liberty and
equality, particularly with its history of slavery, Native American persecution, and
restrictions of women’s rights. As such, several notable legislative acts were required to
help define the legality of social equity, for example, allowing for equal voting rights and
equal employment opportunities. Similarly, legislative acts, such as the Morrill Acts of
1862 and 1890, and the Higher Education Act of 1965, demonstrated the country’s
commitment to providing college access to underrepresented populations in terms of
social class and race. Some colleges established to serve specific populations, while
others focused on educating the masses rather than the elites. In support of the United
States’ heterogeneous population, these various missions allow institutions to serve a
variety of students through individualized degree programs, distinct environmental
2

settings, multiple entry points, and numerous modes of receiving education (Harris,
2013).
This research focused on three types of social equity missions for four-year
institutions: (1) Land-grant institutions for the “industrial classes” (Morrill Act, 1862
Title 7, section 304), (2) institutions that serve underrepresented populations, such as
female and minority students, and (3) inclusive institutions that provide greater access to
admission. Table 1.1 demonstrates the number and type of institutions with social equity
missions. As this table illustrates, 38.1% of the country’s four-year institutions offer at
least one form of social equity mission. Some institutions offer more than one form of
social equity mission; for example, many historically black colleges and universities are
also land-grant institutions, and some institutions target minority women. The
combination of these types of missions provides multiple avenues and support for
underrepresented populations (Harris, 2013).
Table 1.1

Four-year institutions with social equity missions
Four-year institutions

Land-grant
Minority-serving

Asian
Black
Hispanic
Tribal
Women

Inclusive Admissions
Institutions with one or more social equity missions
No social equity mission
All four-year institutions

3

Number
107
13
84
73
33
40
706
829
1,348
2,177

Percentage
4.9%
0.6%
3.9%
3.4%
1.5%
1.8%
32.4%
38.1%
61.9%

Challenges to Social Equity Missions
Along with social equity, the government considers its commitment to efficiency
as part of its moral imperative to the American public (Waldo, 2006; Wilson, 1887). The
recent New Public Management (NPM) or Reinventing Government movement calls for
bureaucracy to run more like a business and to adopt private-sector practices in an effort
to improve efficiency. According to Hood (1991), NPM calls for shifts toward “quasiprivatization,” “explicit standards of measures and performance,” and “greater emphasis
on outputs” (pp. 4-5). Well-known scholars, Osborne and Gaebler (1992), encouraged
public administration to adopt market-like behaviors as a way of achieving efficiency.
With use of performance measures, government agencies could adopt activities that
advance desired outcomes.
The higher education system was not immune from NPM, as state legislators
began pushing for using performance measures as part of the accountability paradigm in
higher education beginning in the 1990s (Alexander, 2000; Ewell, 2008; McLendon,
Hearn, & Deaton, 2006). These performance measures often involve indicators such as
graduation rates and undergraduate enrollment targets, which relate to institutions’
productivity and efficiency (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Conner & Rabovsky, 2011).
Several issues arise from evaluating institutions by their graduation rates. For one,
graduation rates capture only a portion of the college student body: first-time, full-time,
bachelor’s degree-seeking students (NCES, 2013). These rates do not count graduate
students, part-time students, transfer students, or students who started their education in
the past and are returning to college to complete their degrees. Therefore, institutions
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with academic offerings for students outside of the traditional educational career path
would not be evaluated effectively.
Additionally, as Manna (2013) observed, graduation rates report performance in
the aggregate and do not account for gaps in achievement among different student
demographics. Further research indicates that minority and low-income students have the
lowest degree achievement rates, while Asian and White students consistently have the
highest graduation rates (refer to Figure 1.1). According to statistics from NCES (2013),
of the students who started college in 2006, 40.2% of Black and Native American
students graduated by 2012, compared to 62.5% of White and 70.1% of Asian students.
Furthermore, students from the higher income brackets also complete their bachelor’s
degrees at higher rates than those from lower income families. Figure 1.2 illustrates the
completion rates of students from the four tiers of socio-economic statuses. The
bachelor’s attainment gap between the students from the top and bottom income quartiles
is 78 percentage points compared to 33 percentage points in 1970.

6‐Year Graduation Rate

80
70
60
50
40
30
20

1996

1997

Aisan

Figure 1.1

1998
White

1999

2000

2001

Hispanic

2002
Black

2003

2004

2005

Native American

Six-year graduation rates by race/ethnicity (NCES, 2009, 2013)
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2006

Figure 1.2

Proportion of students who entered college and completed a bachelor’s
degree before they turned 24 broken out by income quartiles (The Pell
Institute & Penn AHEAD, 2015)

Finally, researchers assert that institutions, to improve their performance, have
begun limiting enrollment—a process known as selectivity—to students who are likely to
enhance or maintain graduation rates. Selectivity is typically based on admissions tests,
such as ACT or SAT, to evaluate students’ likelihood of success. More often than not,
minority or low-income students do not score as high on these tests as their affluent,
white counterparts (Bial & Rodriguez, 2007; Vigdor & Clotfelter, 2003). Bowman and
Bastedo (2009) found that institutions that increased selectivity had lower student
populations of minority and female students. Institutions may not intentionally be
6

limiting their enrollments to affluent, white students, but selectivity could adversely
affect diversity in the student body.
Problem
The pursuit of increased performance, primarily measured in terms of graduation
rates and selectivity, threatens the United States’ institutional diversity (Harris, 2013;
Morphew, 2009). Many fear that with this decline in aspects of diversity, education may
no longer be the great equalizer it was once imagined (The Pell Institute & Penn
AHEAD, 2015; Torche, 2011). The challenge for evaluating public entities, including the
higher education system, has been (1) identifying potential consequences of a strict
efficiency focus and (2) identifying mission-related measures to account for other aspects
of public values.
Overview
This research developed an education performance index (EPI) to collect
measures that accommodate different institutional missions. A performance index could
help inform policymakers of the consequences of efficiency foci. This instrument may
alleviate some of the concerns of institutions with social equity missions. Perhaps the
failure of some institutions to perform at federally expected levels could mean success to
other types of constituents, particularly underrepresented populations.
The second chapter of this prospectus describes the three theories that inform the research
for the EPI’s development. Ostrom (1973) identified systems of higher education as
polycentric systems with multiple overlapping jurisdictions, diverse communities, and
numerous external demands from various entities. In the case of public goods that affect
7

multiple communities, such as higher education, a single, self-governing body is not
sufficient for handling the externalities (p. 218). The overlap and multitude of college and
university missions help to ensure that many aspects of the nation’s heterogeneous
population are provided educational opportunity. The original authors of polycentricism
were resistant to governmental centralization and are often associated with the public
choice movement; however, research suggests that free-market competition has
homogenizing effects on higher education institutions (Morphew, 2002; Riesman, 1958).
This homogenization restricts institutional diversity, making the system of higher
education less likely to serve underrepresented populations (Harris, 2013).
On the other hand, some argue that government is necessary to uphold social equity
(Frederickson, 1980, 1990) and effectiveness (Waldo, 2006). Frederickson’s new public
administration framework has an institutional approach to governmental practices, but
also allows units to remain decentralized. He feared that public choice-based policies
would not give social equity the same prominence as efficiency (1990). Waldo (2006)
was concerned that government’s preoccupation with business practices and efficiency
turned focus away from effectiveness.
Despite these concerns, government-led performance agenda instill market-like
practices into higher education policies, which also serves to homogenize institutional
missions (Manna, 2013). These market-based policies do not consider aspects of social
equity (Mettler, 2014; Torche, 2011) or educational effectiveness (Derthick & Dunn,
2009; Zemsky, 2007). Ideally, evaluation instruments would account for diverse
institutional missions, while also addressing the concern for efficiency, effectiveness, and
equity.
8

The third chapter describes the development of an EPI that encompasses
educational objectives of efficiency, equity, and effectiveness. After describing the target
population, which focuses on four-year undergraduate institutions in the Southeastern
region, a description of the indicators and their sources is discussed. The EPI would
determine whether institutional characteristics related to their missions influence their
performance.
Chapter four provides the results of the regressions used to test aspects of the EPI
and compare those results to the hypotheses. The linear regressions support the first two
hypotheses that the EPI’s efficiency subscore was significantly related to institutional
characteristics, while the overall EPI minimized the relationship between performance
and institutional characteristics. The EPI was also compared to traditional academic
ranking systems to determine the effectiveness of the new instrument in representing
broad educational objectives. This last comparison partially supported the hypothesis for
regional universities, but regional colleges’ rankings were significantly related to the EPI.
Finally, chapter five analyzes the findings as a whole and considers the
implications of this research, particularly for accrediting bodies and for federal
performance measures. The limitations for this study are also provided along with
suggestions for further research in higher education accountability.
The relevance of this research expands beyond higher education policies.
Numerous policies adopt performance measures and efficiency standards that could
adversely affect social equity. Furthermore, performance policies often exclude missionrelated metrics. This research offers a normative perspective on measuring the
performance of public services.
9

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTABLITY
POLICIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
Since the Progressive era, modernity and pragmatist traditions have dominated
administrative approaches to government. These traditions emphasize quantitative
science and criteria related to efficiency and economy (Luton, 1999; Raadschelders,
2010). Simon (1997) offered two explanations of efficiency: (1) an economic, profitdriven conception with the goal of maximizing returns while also minimizing costs and
calculated as a ratio of inputs to outputs, and (2) an administrative conception that seeks
to attain objectives by choosing activities with the least amount of cost for the largest
results. Many researchers have asserted that the criterion of efficiency does not constitute
a complete image of public administration and its values; however, as Simon (1997)
explained, the search for quantifiable measures often results in “satisficing” tangible
economic objectives in lieu of abstract value premises (p. 252).
This chapter explores how current demands for efficiency, whether through
market competition or through performance-centered policies, reduces institutional
diversity, thereby hampering the system’s ability to serve underrepresented populations.
Ostrom and colleagues’ polycentricism provides the overarching theory for this research,
suggesting that multiple centricities, represented by the nation’s institutional diversity,
must work together to solve common problems. Having a decentralized higher education
10

system may be a more efficient method of providing access for the general public, but
researchers such as Frederickson (1980, 1990), Okun (1975), and Waldo (2006), warn
that too much focus on efficiency downplays the roles of social equity and effectiveness.
In an effort to evaluate institutional success without discouraging social equity, this
research developed an education performance index that would represent efficiency,
equity, and effectiveness.
Theoretical Approach to Polycentric Systems
Vincent Ostrom and his colleagues, Tiebout and Warren, are credited with
creating the term polycentricism to describe multiple decision-making bodies that
compete and cooperate to solve common problems (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961).
Polycentric regimes are characterized by “fragmentation, complexity, and
interdependence between actors,…and their boundaries are marked by the issues or
problems which they are concerned with, rather than necessarily by a common solution”
(Black, 2008, p. 138). Ostrom (1973) defined fragmentation in terms of overlapping
jurisdictions. He discussed how critics oppose fragmentation because of the perceived
duplication of services and waste of resources. Much governmental reform during the
first half and middle of the century sought to unify the duplication through centralization.
Ostrom countered, however, that such overlap is necessary to ensure efficiency and
representation of services to citizens and to minimize the externalities of the common
public goods.

11

Relationship to higher education
Ostrom (1973) identified systems of higher education as polycentric systems with
multiple overlapping jurisdictions, diverse communities, and numerous external demands
from various entities. In the case of public goods, such as higher education, that affect
multiple communities, a single, self-governing body or mission is not sufficient for
handling the externalities (p. 218). The overlap of jurisdictions helps to ensure that all
parties are represented in decisions related to shared public goods. Ostrom contended that
a federalist, polycentric system has its advantages over centralized monopolies. For
example, citizens are better able to voice their concerns and be involved in public affairs,
they can more easily bring grievances against public officials, they can enjoy more public
goods and services than they would under centralized monopolies, and they will have
greater freedom to choose their preferred goods and services.
The polycentric nature of higher education offers the potential for greater
representation of the United States’ diverse population. The American higher education
system encompasses a vast array of institutional types, including colleges and universities
categorized as vocational, two-year or community, liberal arts, women’s, historically
black serving, tribal, religious, research, professional, proprietary, doctoral, and
comprehensive. No one institution could possibly serve the needs of every student and
every economic need (Harris, 2013). Therefore, different institutional missions form the
centricities of the educational system, and many institutions belong to more than one
category, thus overlapping their services.

12

Social equity centricities of higher education
This research focuses on four-year undergraduate institutions with social equity
missions, and these missions specifically seek to offer educational programs to a broader
section of the American population. The first type of social equity mission features
institutions that target certain underrepresented demographics, such as race, ethnicity, and
gender. These institutions that serve various populations are designated either by their
receipt of federal assistance in accordance with Title V or through their membership in
organizations that advance the educational access to underrepresented populations. The
second type of social equity mission accommodates students from various socialeconomic classes. The Morrill Act, land-grant institutions were established to serve the
“industrial classes” as opposed to the elite classes (Morrill Act, 1862). Some institutions
can possess more than one of these social equity missions. For example, half of the landgrant institutions were established for tribal colleges and African-Americans (also known
as historically black colleges and universities). Table 2.1 lists the number of institutional
missions that serve various demographics.
Table 2.1

Number of four-year institutional missions that serve specific
demographics

Land Grant
Not Land Grant
Asian
1
12
Black
20
64
Hispanic
2
72
Native American / Tribal
32
1
Women
0
40
No specific demographic
52
1,885
Total
107
2,070
* Note: Three colleges serve minority women.
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, 2015.
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Total*
13
84
73
33
40
1,937
2,177

The third category of institutions with social equity missions provide greater
access to college admission, as opposed to limiting their student populations based on
certain criteria. The process of selectivity describes admissions practices that accept or
reject students based on academic criteria (Kuh & Pascarella, 2004). Many researchers
assert that selectivity is associated with social class as much as academic ability (Torche,
2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2006b). According to a study on graduation rates,
the U.S. Department of Education (2006b) determined that institutions that serve lowincome students are more likely to be inclusive or less selective institutions versus more
selective. Several factors associated with social class could be related to higher test
scores. Students from higher income brackets can afford prestigious, private collegepreparatory secondary schools. They also have available funding to invest in preparations
for standardized admissions tests, such as the SAT or ACT exams (Bial & Rodriguez,
2007; Oseguera & Astin, 2004). If they perform poorly on one of these standardized tests,
as most students do the first time they take these tests, they can afford to retake the exam
as many times as they feel necessary, which then increases their chances of scoring
higher on the exam (Vigdor & Clotfelter, 2003). Therefore, inclusive or less selective
institutions could be said to have social equity missions in promoting college access for
low-income families. Selectivity in admissions processes are measured as inclusive,
selective, or more selective by institutions’ Carnegie Undergraduate Profile, which is
reported in the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Table 2.2 demonstrates
the levels of access to college admission.
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Table 2.2

Number of four-year institutions by admissions selectivity

Undergraduate Profile
Number
Percentage
Inclusive
706
32.4%
Selective
708
32.5%
More Selective
763
35.0%
Total
2,177
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, Carnegie Undergraduate Profile,
2015.
Public choice in higher education
With the proliferation of different institutional missions, standardized data and
market signals were needed to indicate prestigious institutions from those that serve the
masses. Thus, academic ranking publications, such as U.S. News and World Report,
emerged to inform the public about the level of institutional prestige (Hamrick, Schuh, &
Shelley, 2004). Much of the data to support the U.S. News and World Report (USNWR)
Rankings comes from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Integrated
Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS), which all postsecondary institutions must populate
based on federally defined definitions. USNWR also surveys an institution’s peers to
determine its reputation. The primary determinants in these academic rankings are peer
reputation and the perceived quality of students’ academic abilities as measured through
metrics such as graduation and retention rates and institutional selectivity. Selectivity
signals educational prestige, because it indicates that an institution has more demand than
it can accommodate and can choose which students to admit (Kuh & Pascarella, 2004).
Multitudes of research suggests that prospective students seek information about
colleges and universities through these types of publications (Bell, Rowan-Kenyon, &
Perna, 2009; Meredith, 2004), and these ranking systems have succeeded in directing
students’ enrollment behaviors toward colleges and universities that have higher scores
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(Bastedo & Bowman, 2010; Bowman & Bastedo, 2009). These prolific researchers have
provided ample evidence that academic rankings are more influential to students and their
parents than governmental sources, such as NCES.
A few theorists and critics support the logic of academic rankings as informing
the market behaviors of a decentralized, privatized higher education system. These critics
suggest that the higher education system, largely sustained by governmental subsidies,
ought to be subject to market-based competition (Bankston, 2011; Chubb & Moe, 1988;
Winston, 1999). Increased competition would help improve educational efficiency
because institutions with poor quality could not attract new students (Anctil, 2008), and
institutions would not be tasked with the inefficient process of teaching non-collegeready students (Bankston, 2011; Wood, 2012). A privatized higher education system
would encourage practices of rivalry and excludability as opposed to educating the
masses.
Shortcomings of higher education polycentricism
Unfortunately, in its quest for efficiency, this market-driven, decentralized system
has two negative trends for higher education: (1) reduction in access to enrollment and
diversity within the student body, and (2) homogenizing effects on institutional diversity
within the nation. Both of these trends have adverse effects on social equity.
The focus on selectivity often excludes minority and low-income students from
admission to college. Bastedo and Bowman (2010; 2009) noticed a correlation between
high academic rankings and low diversity in the student body. In their analysis, they
found that as an institution raised its academic profile, it began excluding more females,
more minorities, and more Pell grant students. They even go as far as to assert that
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institutions with high proportions of minority students may be a signal of lower quality to
unknowing potential students and their families. Bial and Rodriguez (2007) found that
institutions may not deliberately prevent minority students from admissions, but rather
put too much emphasis on high scores in admissions tests or in high school GPAs. Their
research led them to conclude that a gap exists between white and minority students;
thereby, making admissions to college more difficult for minority students. If selectivity
based on admissions tests and GPAs continues to increase, then access to college
admission may decline further for minority students.
On the other hand, Carnevale and Rose (2003) found that diversity in socioeconomic status (SES) remains a larger problem than low diversity in racial and ethnic
students. They found that highly selective institutions were more likely to enroll minority
students than low-income students. Other researchers, such as Ballinger (2007) and
Mettler (2014), have found similar trends that high-income students enjoy far greater
access to college enrollment and completion than low-income students. Ballinger
concluded that that the majority of high-income students, regardless of academic ability,
attend a college or university; however, less than half of low-income students are able to
enroll. High-income students are more likely to have educational support from their
parents, access to college guidance counselors, access to more rigorous schools, and
funds to attend the most selective institutions. Mettler contends that even high-achieving,
low-income students were less likely to attend and complete college than their lowachieving, high-income counterparts.
Some might argue that race and SES are intertwined, and in some parts of the
country may even be equivalent (Wood, n.d.). Sirin (2005) studied academic
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achievement, albeit at the secondary level, to determine the role of SES in schooling. He
found that socio-economic differences matter for white students, but that the correlations
nearly disappeared for minority students, particularly African-Americans. It should be
noted that his study was a meta-analysis of research that had been published over several
years. Along the same lines, Vigdor and Clotfelter (2003) found that retaking admissions
tests help raise scores, and white students were more likely than minority students to
retake an exam, mainly because of associated costs of the exams. Therefore, affluent
white students had higher scores than their low-income and minority counterparts. These
researchers suggested that colleges ought to accept only the first test scores so as to
minimize the negative impact on low-income and minority students. Carnevale and Rose
(2003) suggested that socio-economic status often relates to race and ethnicity; however,
this access problem also affects low-income White students. They found that over 80% of
college students come from the top quartile of family income. Although still
predominantly white, selective institutions have a higher diversity among race/ethnicity
than family income. The study also indicates that racial inequality is not equivalent to
income inequality; however, Blacks and Hispanics tend to come from lower income
brackets.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates how U.S. News and World Report rewards selective
institutions in both the national university and national liberal arts college rankings. Very
selective institutions, in terms of their Undergraduate Profile in IPEDS, comprise 100%
of the top tier and 90.9% of the second tier in the 2014 educational rankings. Few
inclusive institutions appear in the rankings, and most of the ranked inclusive institutions
score in the bottom tier. These data suggest a relationship between prestige and
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selectivity, which in turn discourages social equity. Table 2.3 provides a summary about
studies that demonstrate how competition for high-ability students and exclusion of lowability students encourages social inequality.

100.0%

100.0%

90.9%

87.8%

75.0%
57.0%
50.0%

43.0%

25.0%
0.0%
0.0%

7.1%
2.0%

6.8%
0.0%

5.4%

0.0%
Top tier

Second tier
Very Selective

Figure 2.1

Third tier
Selective

Bottom tier

Inclusive

Four tiers of 2014 U.S. News and World Reports educational rankings for
national universities and liberal arts colleges by admissions selectivity.

SOURCE: U.S. News and World Report National University Rankings (2014) and
National Liberal Arts College Rankings (2014), and Undergraduate Profile data from the
National Center of Education Statistics, IPEDS.
The competition among higher education institutions raises additional concerns
for homogeneity (Oseguera & Astin, 2004). In an effort to remain competitive, lower
ranked institutions may adopt behaviors of prestigious institutions to rise in the academic
ranks (Ayalon, 2007; Bastedo & Bowman, 2011; Hossler, 2000). David Riesman (1958)
coined the term “academic drift” to describe this effort to mimic highly ranked
institutions. Riesman compared the movement of higher education to that of a snake
where the tail, low-ranked institutions, follows the direction of the head, the more
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prestigious universities. Academic drift essentially works toward homogenizing the types
of institutions in the country as some feel the need to adopt more selective admissions
policies that result in a less diverse student body or change their missions and curricular
offerings (Birnbaum, 1983; Morphew, 2009). Morphew, in particular, found that
institutions sought to become more comprehensive and reclassify themselves from
college to university. In his longitudinal analysis, he found that institutions tried to
advance themselves in Carnegie Classifications as if those classifications were equivalent
to national rankings. It is true that people are often most familiar with the U.S. News and
World Report national rankings, which are comprised specifically of institutions that
have Carnegie Classification of research/doctoral. Although Morphew’s analysis is more
recent, dating back to the 1990s, his conclusions affirm those of Birnbaums that date back
to the 1960s. Both assert that institutions compete with one another for students, and as a
result, they forgo their original missions in an effort to conform to market practices.
Thus, the studies from Table 2.3 and those supporting academic drift indicate that rivalry
and excludability directly contrast with higher education’s social equity missions.
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Table 2.3

Studies that suggest that competition adversely affects social inequality

Biases against minority students
Author(s)
(Bial & Rodriguez,
2007)

Findings
High ability students are determined through high school GPA
and standardized tests. Their evidence suggested a gap between
the test scores of African-Americans and White students.
(Bowman & Bastedo, Changes in rank resulted in changes in enrollment demographics
2009)
with fewer minority and female students. The authors extrapolate
that higher minority and female proportions in the student body
signal lower quality.
(Vigdor & Clotfelter, Authors found that students’ SAT scores increased every time
2003)
they retook the exam. Minority students were less likely to retake
the exam often because additional tests were cost prohibitive;
therefore, they held lower scores than their White counterparts.
Biases against low-income students
Author(s)
(Ballinger, 2007)

(Carnevale & Rose,
2003)

(Mettler, 2014)

Findings
This author notes that the majority of high-income students,
regardless of academic ability, attend a college or university;
however, less than half of low-income students are able to enroll.
High-income students are more likely to have educational support
from their parents, access to college guidance counselors, access
to more rigorous schools, and funds to attend the most selective
institutions.
They found that over 80% of the students come from the top
quartile of family income. Although still predominantly white,
selective institutions have a higher diversity among race/ethnicity
than family income. The study also indicates that racial inequality
is not equivalent to income inequality; however, Blacks and
Hispanics tend to come from lower income brackets.
Her research indicated that students from the highest income
bracket were more likely to attend and complete a college
education than all of the other income brackets combined. She
concluded that even high-achieving, low-income students were
less likely to attend and complete college than their lowachieving, high-income counterparts.
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Table 2.3 (Continued)
Biases against low-income students continued
Author(s)
Findings
(Beller & Hout, 2006) Students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds were far less
likely to complete schooling than those from more advantaged
families. They found a strong correlation between higher
socioeconomic statuses and educational attainment.
(Stephens, Fryberg,
The typical atmosphere on campuses tends to cater toward the
Markus, Johnson, & middle- and upper-class citizens with parents who are college
Covarrubias, 2012)
educated, making it extremely difficult for first-generation
college students to succeed.
(Oseguera & Astin,
They found that socioeconomic status had become more stratified
2004)
in higher education, with fewer low-income students than ever
enrolled in more selective institutions. They theorized that the
reason stems from increased competition among institutions of
higher education, which thereby increases admissions standards.

If this trend continues, then the country may see a decline in the number of
institutions with social equity missions. The near closing of Sweet Briar signifies a recent
example of this trend. Institution leaders cited the inability to compete against
coeducational research and comprehensive institutions as rationale for its closure. Some
people (e.g., Bankston, 2011; Vedder, 2004) believe that such instances symbolize the
efficiency of the market and that any government attempt to sustain a failing institution
damages educational quality. Others (e.g., Harris, 2013; Morphew, 2009) feel that
preserving institutional diversity allows the higher education system to better serve the
country’s heterogeneous population.
Theoretical Approaches to Social Equity
Only a few notable theorists believe that education should be completely free
from government planning (e.g., Hayek, 1978). Many authors have concluded that free22

market capitalism requires governmental bureaucracy to uphold it (McSwite, 2002;
Milgrom, North, & Weingast, 1990; Stanisevski, 2004), and as the prior literature
suggests (e.g., Alexander, 2000; Derthick & Dunn, 2009), the government has been
taking steps to increase its role in higher education accountability rather than relinquish
control to the markets.
In what began as the new public administration movement during the 1960s,
Frederickson (1980) asserted that government’s responsibilities ought to include
advancing social equity and maintaining normative ideals of a democratic society. Social
equity pertains to “the equitable treatment of citizens” (p. 7). He suggested that
bureaucracy discriminates against minorities in favor of the established, and the result
“constitutes a fundamental, if long-range, threat to the viability of this or any political
system” (p. 7). Frederickson criticizes public choice approaches to government, because
the consumer approach to government places the individual desires, signaled through
competitive markets, above the collective good of society. In preserving social equity, the
government ought to ensure that services are administered equally and in a manner that
does not perpetuate existing inequities. Thus, Frederickson (1980, 1990) called for
considerations of social equity as important as efficiency and economy in government.
However, it would seem that the recent new public management (NPM) or
reinventing government furthered the advancement of efficiency and economy, calling
for bureaucracy to run more like a business and to adopt private-sector practices.
According to Hood (1991), NPM calls for shifts toward “quasi-privatization,” “explicit
standards of measures and performance,” and “greater emphasis on outputs” (pp. 4-5).
Well-known scholars, Osborne and Gaebler (1992), encouraged public administration to
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adopt market-like behaviors as a way of achieving efficiency. With the use of
performance measures, government agencies could adopt activities that advance desired
outcomes. According to authors such as Frederickson (1980) and Harmon (1989), these
outcomes often assume a value-neutral approach without considering factors of
discrimination and inequality.
Shortcomings in governmental regulation
Initially, governmental involvement in higher education policy could be said to
parallel the intentions of new public administration. The Morrill Acts (1860s and 1890s)
and the Higher Education Act (1965) advanced social equity through redistribution of
services and resources to underrepresented populations. The Higher Education Act has
been reauthorized many times since its creation, and each time more government
regulations have been added. However, policies such as the Higher Education Act were
not immune from reinventing government, as market-like practices or the “market ethos”
(McSwite, 2002) influenced government practices.
State legislators began pushing for using performance measures as part of the
accountability paradigm in higher education beginning in the 1990s and continuing
through present time (Alexander, 2000; Ewell, 2008; McLendon et al., 2006). More
recently, President Obama declared college completion as the federal government’s
primary outcome for all of higher education and proposed the use of performance metrics
to evaluate institutions’ progress toward achieving this goal (The White House, 2012,
2014). As SACSCOC President Belle Wheelan explained in her opening address at the
2013 Annual Meeting, the government has shifted its priorities from providing greater
access to college toward graduating the students who can get accepted to college (2013).
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Many critics suggest that the initial intentions of the higher education acts have been
modified to focus on efficiency without regard for equity (Mettler, 2014; Torche, 2011).
Just like with free-market competition, government regulation can have
exclusionary effects on prospective college students. As colleges adjust their practices to
conform with educational policies and performance agenda, they may restrict their
enrollments to accept only students who are likely to graduate college within six years
(Lahr et al., 2014; Manna, 2013). This restriction to admissions and narrowing of
institutional missions is “the most commonly mentioned unintended impact of
performance funding” (Dougherty et al., 2014, p. 178). As previously described,
selectivity in admissions tends to exclude minority and low-income students (e.g., Bial &
Rodriguez, 2007; Carnevale & Rose, 2003).
Governmental financial aid policies further the exclusionary practices in keeping
with its market ethos. Pell grants and other similar grant packages for low-income
students have not kept pace with the escalating costs of college (Mettler, 2014), and,
therefore, low-income students must secure other forms of scholarships or loans if they
want to attend college. Long (2010) found that the expansion of grant aid, such as the Pell
grant initiative, helped high-achieving, low-income students select better schools, rather
than encourage more low-income students to seek admissions to college.
Often, state and institutional scholarships or grants are structured in a merit-based
format to reward high-ability students rather than a need-based format that assists lowincome students (e.g., Brown, 2007; Doyle, 2010). Doyle described merit-based financial
aid packages as favoring students with the highest academic qualifications. He argued
that state financial aid plans are structured as merit-based so as to appease the tax-paying
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public who want their tax dollars to go to whom they feel are deserving. Furthermore,
Doyle and his colleagues (Doyle, Delaney, & Naughton, 2009) found that institutions
were more likely to comply with state financial aid models and also award merit-based
aid over need-based aid. As previously described, high-ability students include those who
score high on standardized tests or have strong college preparatory backgrounds. Thus,
financial aid packages are structured to reward students from higher socio-economic
statuses over students from low-income and minority families. Brown, who titled his
article “Merit aid: The practice of giving money to those who do not need it,” portended
that institutions rely on merit aid to “sculpt” (p. 45) their incoming freshman classes to
help raise the academic profile and rankings of the institution. In this manner, financial
assistance often goes to students from the most affluent families rather than to the
students from the lower-income brackets. Table 2.4 provides more literature about how
government financial aid policies affect social equity.
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Table 2.4

Government financial aid policies and effects on social equity

Author(s)
(Long, 2010)

Findings
Found that the expansion of grant aid, such as the Pell grant initiative
helped low-income students select better schools, rather than encourage
more low-income students to enroll in college. He contended that the
current financial support system for higher education does not enhance
the desired outcomes because it perpetuates the unequal access dilemma.
(Mettler, 2014) Also found an enormous gap in college attendance between the highincome and low-income students. She explained that this disparity in
enrollment and completion among the socioeconomic classes could be
the result of what she called “policyscape,” which is “a political
landscape densely cluttered with a vast array of policies of all varieties
that…do not function as effectively as they once did” (p. 14). Federal
Pell grants have not kept pace with the rising college costs, and policy
designs tend to cater toward the wealthy populations. She feels that bold
legislation with bipartisan support could fix the higher education crisis
and reset the balance of social justice.
(Doyle, 2010) States’ financial aid policies use merit-based criteria over need-based
criteria in accord for the tax-paying public’s perception of deserving
individuals. He suggested that public institutions run the risk of
eliminating their middle class students as a result of merit-based
financial awards.
(Doyle et al.,
Found that institutions follow the lead of state financial aid policies. As
2009)
most states policies feature merit-based awards, so do public institutions.
(Brown, 2007) He pointed out that 80% of an institution’s scholarship money was
focused on merit rather than on financial need. Brown asserted that
colleges and universities practice this form of financial aid because they
want to “sculpt” their incoming freshman classes, which helps raise the
academic profile of the institution (p. 45). Therefore, merit-based
financial aid awards scholarships and financial assistance most often go
to students from the most affluent families.
(Kim, 2012)
The study indicated that need-based financial aid did close the income
gap at both nonselective and selective colleges; however, merit-based
aid did not affect low-income and minority students. Thus, the continued
focus on selectivity without consideration for need will decrease access
for disadvantaged or minority students.

The governmental trends described in this section indicate that bureaucratic
involvement without consideration for social equity has the same effect as market-driven
selectivity and homogenization. Figure 2.2 depicts how both free-market competition and
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governmental regulation can decrease the diversity of institutional missions. Therefore, a
balance must be struck: a socially conscious polycentric network requires government
regulation that considers the policy effects on social equity.

Figure 2.2

Depiction of market influences and government regulation on institutional
diversity

Measures of Effectiveness in Higher Education
Another criticism with the narrow consideration for efficiency in higher education
suggests that productivity measures do not necessarily signal effectiveness. As McSwite
(1996) noted, the public often equates efficiency with effectiveness. Waldo (2006) was
especially concerned that the pursuit of efficiency and productivity downplays the
importance of effectiveness. He worried that this narrow perspective threatened the
nation’s democratic values by putting the goals of business above the goals of
government. Likewise, Stone (2002) asserted that efficiency targets are not goals in and
of themselves, but rather short-term objectives toward achieving the long-term outcomes.
Therefore, seeking efficient services as the end product could negatively affect the longterm goals.
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Similar criticisms about recent educational policies also abound as many observe
the absence of measures for effective educational practices (e.g., Lingenfelter, 2007;
Zemsky, 2007). Graduating students efficiently does not also ensure that those students
have learned the requisite material (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Arum & Roksa, 2011).
Derthick and Dunn’s (2009) analysis of the 2008 reauthorization of the 1965 Higher
Education Act (HEA) asserted that the Act expands with every reauthorization, but very
little focuses on effectiveness. They stated that the reauthorization “… was
quintessentially a product of the legislature: 1158 pages long, with roughly seventy new
spending programs targeted to narrow constituencies and nearly two hundred new
reporting and regulatory requirements…. Virtually none of the new regulations is in any
way instrumental to the advance of learning” (p. 1029-1030). Zemsky (2007), a member
of the Spellings Commission on the Future of Higher Education that informed the most
recent reauthorization of the HEA, lamented that college affordability and student
learning were listed as the highest objectives for the commissions’ analysis, but neither of
these were addressed in the final report. To address student learning would require either
more time or more money on the part of the student or the institution—both options
diminish the institution’s efficiency.
Furthermore, as institutions direct more funds toward initiatives to improve
retention and graduation rates to meet national imperatives, they may then have less to
spend on instructional costs, such as facilities, learning technologies, or full-time faculty
(Derthick & Dunn, 2009; Zemsky, 2007). Dougherty and colleagues (Dougherty, Natow,
Bork, Jones, & Vega, 2013) found that institutions in response to performance pressures
would close programs or classes with high failure rates while investing more in retention
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programs. Grade inflation could also occur as faculty members feel pressure to pass
students rather than issue grades that may interfere with their graduation (Jewell,
McPherson, & Tieslau, 2013; Summary & Weber, 2012). Archibald and Feldman
(2008b) declared that institutions cannot graduate one hundred percent of the students
they enroll; therefore, incentivizing institutions to graduate more students who may or
may not have achieved the desired learning outcomes seems to contradict the intent of
graduating more students.
Finally, many higher education critics assert that the focus on non-instructional
activities results in graduating students who do not possess the same levels of learning as
previous generations (Arum & Roksa, 2011; Bok, 2008). Former President of Harvard
University, Derek Bok, along with Arum and Roksa, studied numerous standardized tests
and surveys to determine that students are not improving their critical thinking, analytical
reasoning, moral reasoning, or writing skills during their early college years.
Furthermore, students reported that faculty do not require lengthy papers or even a
significant amount of reading. Bankston (2011) in particular faults the ideal of educating
the masses because of the resulting decline in student learning. He concluded that math
scores in the 2000s have finally reached their post-war levels. Reading levels, on the
other hand, reached their peak in the 1950s and 1960s, and scores have never come close
to those high marks. Table 2.5 provides a summary of the literature describing how
government regulation has affected educational effectiveness.
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Table 2.5

Government regulation and concerns for effectiveness

Author(s)
Findings
(Bankston, 2011) Once the government compelled institutions to educate the masses, student
learning declined. He suggested that by the 2000s, math scores finally returned
to their post-war levels, but reading levels reached their peak in the 1950s and
1960s, and scores have never come close to those high marks.
(Archibald &
Colleges neither could nor desire to graduate one hundred percent of the
Feldman, 2008b) students they enroll. Incentivizing institutions to graduate more students who
may or may not have achieved the desired learning outcomes seems to
contradict the intent of graduating more students.
(Zemsky, 2007) As a member of the Spellings Commission, he later lamented how college
affordability and improved student learning were listed as the highest
objectives for the commission’s analysis, and yet neither of those issues were
fully addressed in the final report. Enhancing student learning would require a
greater financial or time commitment either from the institutions or from the
students—both trends diminish an institution’s efficiency.
(Derthick &
Pointed out that the most recent reauthorization of the Higher Education Act
Dunn, 2009)
included no provisions for enhancing, tracking, or measuring teaching and
learning.
(Bok, 2008)
Although students achieve a great deal from their college experiences, students
report that they have not made much gains in terms of their writing abilities,
quantitative reasoning skills, moral reasoning, or cultural knowledge.
Furthermore, the most important classes for these students are often taught by
the least qualified or part-time faculty members, particularly classes specific to
writing or general education.
(Arum & Roksa, Students are not improving their critical thinking, analytical, reasoning, or
2011)
writing skills during their first couple of years in college. Furthermore, faculty
are not asking students to devote enough time to developing these skills,
because 50% of the students responded that they had not taken a course in the
prior semester that required a lengthy paper or even a significant amount of
reading.
(Landrum, 2009) Institutions rely more on part-time faculty than ever before; therefore, he
studied the instructional differences between full-time and part-time faculty.
He found no differences in grade distributions or results of student evaluations
of teaching, but he did find significant differences in support for full-time over
part-time, and a decrease in students’ ability to access part-time faculty outside
of class. He did not determine whether part-time faculty achieved the same
learning outcomes as full-time counterparts.
Asserted that over the past several decades, grades have increased without a
(Grove &
corresponding increase in rigor. They studied five cohorts and uncovered that
Wasserman,
earlier cohorts had significantly lower GPAs than later cohorts.
2004)
(Dougherty et al., Found that in response to performance agenda, institutions did make changes
2013)
to their own practices, such as closing programs and practices that adversely
affected the institution’s performance or eliminating requirements for classes
with high failure rates.
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Shortcomings of focusing on educational effectiveness
Incorporating effectiveness measures into the performance scenario is not without
its criticisms. For one, political and educational leaders cannot agree on how to measure
effectiveness. Many authors point out the difficulty in measuring long-term, missionbased outcomes, particularly for public entities (Lauth, 1987; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom,
2002). Some standardized tests have emerged to attempt to fulfill this role of measuring
student competencies, such as the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA), National
Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE), and the Educational Testing Service (ETS)
(Nichols & Berliner, 2008; Steedle, Kugelmass, & Nemeth, 2010). These tests attract as
many criticisms as they do accolades from narrow views of student learning (Klein,
Benjamin, Shavelson, & Bolus, 2007) to issues of under sampling the student population
and low response rates (Porter & Whitcomb, 2005) to biases against minorities (Bial &
Rodriguez, 2007). Because of these difficulties, policies substitute proxy measures,
particularly those that favor efficiency and productivity, which are easier to measure
(Kelly & Rivenbark, 2003; Simon, 1997; Thompson, 1994).
Another shortcoming for incorporating effectiveness into the performance arena
suggests a greater investment in time and resources. Studies show that under-prepared
students rarely graduate within six years of their initial enrollment in college (Archibald
& Feldman, 2008b). A large portion of these students may drop out of college, and others
extend their academic studies well past six years. The U.S. Department of Education
(2006b) suggested that inclusive or less selective institutions enroll higher proportions of
underprepared students, and many studies suggest gaps in academic performance among
minority and female populations. Providing effective education for these students
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involves more time to deliver academic content than those who had the advantage of
college preparation through their primary and secondary school systems (Bok, 2008;
Zemsky, 2007). As a result, low-ability students are less likely to complete college within
a six-year timeframe, and the institutions that serve these students will have lower
graduation rates.
For all of the reasons discussed in this section, student learning assessment is
challenging to measure in a comparative way. Either education policies must be satisfied
using the proxies, or institutions must be trusted to continue assessing and improving
student learning on their own without comparisons to other colleges.
Role of Accreditation in Evaluating Higher Education
Performance agenda are a relatively new tool in evaluating higher education
(Alexander, 2000). Accrediting bodies have held the primary responsibility for evaluating
colleges and universities for over 100 years (Brittingham, 2009; Wheelan & Elgart,
2016). As Brittingham (2009) described, accreditation adds another layer of uniqueness
to the American higher education system. In this country, accreditation is nongovernmental, largely voluntary, and heavily reliant on self-assessment to both set
standards for evaluation and to serve as a reference by which to identify strengths and
weaknesses. Eaton (2009) listed four primary roles for accreditation: (1) determining
quality assurance, (2) providing access to federal funds, (3) signaling effectiveness for the
private sector in terms of employers and donors, and (4) facilitating the transfer of
credits. Numerous authors contend that accrediting bodies can evaluate institutional
effectiveness without adversely affecting social equity (Bardo, 2009; Kuh & Ewell, 2010;
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Wheelan & Elgart, 2016). However, accrediting bodies have also been called into
question with the emergence of NPM ideals.
The 2000s saw a distinct shift in how institutions of higher education are
governed, moving away from peer and self regulation to increased governmental
oversight that focuses on performance and results (Alexander, 2000; McLendon et al.,
2006; Webber & Boehmer, 2008). After former-President Bush appointed the National
Commission on the Future of Higher Education, the commission found “a lack of clear,
reliable information about the cost and quality of postsecondary institutions, along with a
remarkable absence of accountability mechanisms” (U.S. Department of Education,
2006, p. x). Institutions and accrediting agencies ought to be more transparent and to
document and improve student learning. The most recent reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act originally began in 2003 and intended for the federal government to take
over accreditation, particularly in light of the commission’s report (Derthick & Dunn,
2009; Webber & Boehmer, 2008). However, legislators met with so much opposition that
the reauthorization, which was not finalized until 2008, settled for increased regulations
on accrediting bodies (Bardo, 2009; Graca, 2009).
More recently, the U.S. Department of Education (Mitchell, 2016) drafted a letter
to the leaders of the regional accrediting bodies. This letter expressed concerns for
students who are adversely affected by recent school closures—specifically for-profit
institutions—and escalating financial situations. As a result, the department suggested
that accrediting bodies be more flexible in their reaffirmation processes so that they do
not have to spend as much resources on high-performing institutions as they would on
those that they have reason to believe are underperforming. At the same time, the
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department chastised the accreditation process for not being rigorous enough in enforcing
student learning: “Regional accreditors tend to use qualitative measures of student
achievement, and tend not to have numerical metrics. We encourage them to consider
adding objective, transparent, comparable, and actionable quantitative measures.
Important measures, such as retention, graduation, and cohort default rates may be
utilized if they are not already” (p. 6).
In response, two accreditation leaders published an editorial that stated that the
department is “crossing the line” by forcing a narrow perspective of outcomes upon
regional accreditation (Wheelan & Elgart, 2016). These leaders were concerned most
about mingling the ideals of improved student learning with regulations that sustain
federal financial aid. Although these quantitative measures for graduation rates and
default rates are important for how college effects students, these data do not help
institutions improve their educational programs to benefit student learning. The editorial
specifies the following unintended consequences of these narrow foci: (1) reducing
access to underserved populations, (2) punishing institutions for economic circumstances
beyond their control (such as a down economy with high unemployment or reduced state
funding), and (3) encouraging institutions to manipulate or game the data rather than face
negative actions. By forcing accreditation to conform to these types of outcomes,
oversight becomes “more like a data-collection service” (para. 1). None of these
arguments or criticisms are new, and the debate that began in the 2000s continues
unreconciled. The concerns of the accreditation leaders echo the concerns of Waldo
(2006), who feared an emphasis on efficiency downplayed the role of effectiveness, and
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Frederickson (Frederickson, 1980, 1990), who feared that such practices neglect social
equity.
One of the more government-sympathetic regional accreditation leaders, Stephen
Crow (2009), executive president of the Higher Learning Commission, explained that
despite the numerous criticisms from public policymakers and institutional leaders,
accreditation remains irreplaceable in its role on quality assurance. He also pointed out
that the federal government and accrediting agencies need each other. Accreditation can
be the tool to demonstrate accountability and to analyze student learning, but federal
financial aid is invaluable to institutions and students. He concluded that research is
needed to find a way to both control for institutional missions and still determine
appropriate benchmarks for effectiveness, including nationally established ideals.
The Need for Better Measurements
As described in this literature review the aspects of efficiency, equity, and
effectiveness seem to contradict each other, as do the roles of the many stakeholders in
higher education. Neither frameworks of polycentricism or new public administration
capture the complex educational policy issues. Education leaders recommend a blend:
preserving institutional diversity and autonomous missions with policy input from
government. Bok (2008) and Zemsky (2007)—who both worked with The Secretary of
Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education—suggested that the best
way for colleges to improve student learning is not at the national level with additional
reporting requirements, but at the institutional level in conjunction with the faculty and
the teaching experts of the specific student populations. They support a decentralized
system under a federalist structure, preserving the diversity of institutional missions. As
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Manna (2009, 2013) pointed out, educational leaders do not want to sever ties with the
government, because educational policies are needed to ensure that these national issues
related to efficiency, effectiveness, and equity remain at the forefront. Crow (2009) also
asserted that institutional mission alone does not address a broad national problem related
to student learning and affordability. These initiatives must all be combined for a more
comprehensive picture of accountability.
The federal government’s performance management solutions seem one-sided, as
do the accreditation processes. Many researchers have noted that only what is measured
in performance regimes receives attention, and existing performance agenda often do not
consider aspects of equity and effectiveness in addition to productivity metrics (Jennings,
2010; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002). Accountability instruments must also allow for
disparate institutional missions because a one-size-fits-all accountability model is not
appropriate for heterogeneous populations. Frederickson specifically called for more
research to identify alternative policy structures to accommodate social equity (1990, pp.
235-236). Others point out that focusing strictly on institutional missions misses the
larger national goals (Crow, 2009; Manna, 2009). Without the help of the federal
government, higher education institutions would not be contributing to national
outcomes, and social equity policies would have little authority. Thus, an instrument that
controls for multiple missions and combines national imperatives supports the polycentric
nature of the higher education system as well as broader social values.
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METHODOLOGY
This study developed a new accountability instrument and conducted a
subsequent comparative test of that instrument against traditional performance ranking
systems. For the purpose of this study, four-year institutions in the southern region of the
United States serve as the primary focus, because this region has the highest proportion
of social equity missions. An educational performance index (EPI) was created that
combined data from various sources to provide a composite score for each institution in
the study out of a possible 100%. Indicators for the EPI were identified under the broad
objectives of efficiency, equity, and effectiveness. The intent of this index is to prevent
institutions with higher effectiveness or equity but lower efficiency scores from being
punished as they would in traditional measures that emphasize only efficiency. Linear
regressions were used to test the influence that social equity missions have on
institutions’ EPI scores. Additionally, regressions compared the relationship between the
EPI and traditional academic rankings.
Research Questions
Guiding the research design and hypotheses were the following questions:


No one institution type can serve all students, all missions, or all of the
country’s or states’ needs. If institutions with social equity missions
perform lower than those without these missions, then the former
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institutions will be at a disadvantage. How do social equity missions
influence institutional performance?


If institutions that serve underrepresented populations may be adversely
effected by efficiency-driven policies, then how can policy-makers best
measure higher education in a manner that also protects social equity?
Research Hypotheses

These hypotheses tested the relationship between institutional mission and
performance. Table 3.1 at the end of this section provides a list of the variables included
in this study.
H1

Social equity missions will have no influence on an institution’s EPI
composite score.

EPI = α + β1(Access) + β2(Population) + β3(LandGrant) + β4(Privatenonprofit) + β5(Private-forprofit) + β6(Master’s) + β7(Baccalaureate) +
β8(Special) + ε

Institutional missions should not be the basis of performance scores; rather other factors
related to efficiency, effectiveness, and equity ought to determine an institution’s success
or failure. The EPI incorporates factors of equity and effectiveness equal to efficiency as
Frederickson (1990) advanced in his call for alternative policy designs. Furthermore,
these considerations echo the concerns of critics who fear that performance-based
policies downplay the role of public missions (Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002;
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Thompson, 1994). If the EPI can control for institutional mission, then it could preserve
institutional diversity in a socially responsible performance regime.

H2

Institutions with social equity missions will have lower graduation rates
than institutions with no social equity missions.

Graduation rate = α + β1(Access) + β2(Population) + β3(LandGrant) +
β4(Private-nonprofit) + β5(Private-forprofit) + β6(Master’s) +
β7(Baccalaureate) + β8(Special) + ε

Calls for accountability pressures institutions to increase their graduation rates as a
demonstration of success. Prior research indicates that graduation rates demonstrate an
institution’s efficiency rather than its effectiveness (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2008b).
The U.S. Department of Education, among other researchers, has already recognized that
institutions with social equity missions have lower graduation rates. Mettler (2014) and
Torch (2011) asserted that the pursuit of higher graduation rates encourages institutions
to limit access to low-income and minority students. This hypothesis tests the relationship
between graduation rates and social equity missions.

H3

An institution’s EPI score is not related to its U.S. News and World
Report Score
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EPI = α + β1(Access) + β2(Population) + β3(LandGrant) + β4(Privatenonprofit) + β5(Private-forprofit) + β6(Master’s) + β7(Baccalaureate) +
β8(Special) + β9(USNWR) + ε

Theorists such as Frederickson (1980) and Waldo (2006) feared that the preoccupation
with efficiency downplays the role of social equity and effectiveness. Many critics assert
that the traditional performance measures in terms of academic rankings focus primarily
on efficiency measures (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Hamrick et al., 2004). This last
hypothesis evaluates the effectiveness of the EPI in accounting for efficiency,
effectiveness, or equity. If efficiency can also predict effectiveness and equity, then there
should be no significant difference in the EPI and traditional performance measures.
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Table 3.1

Study constructs

Dependent Variable
(Abbrev.)
Education Performance
Index (EPI)
Graduation Rates
Access to admissions
(Access)

Targeted populations
(Population)

Land Grant status
(LandGrant)
U.S. News and World
Report score (USNWR)

Source
The proposed EPI collects 10 indicators to evaluate
institutional performance within the categories of efficiency,
effectiveness, and equity.
Scale: 0 – 100, with 0 being lowest and 100 being highest
From NCES’s six-year graduation rate. Scale: 0 – 100, with 0
being lowest and 100 being highest
From NCES’s Carnegie Undergraduate Profile, institution’s
degree of selectivity:
9. Full-time four-year, inclusive
10. Full-time four-year, selective, lower transfer-in
11. Full-time four-year, selective, higher transfer-in
12. Full-time four-year, more selective, lower transfer-in
13. Full-time four-year, more selective, higher transfer-in
Coded: 1 = 9, 0 = all other options
NCES contains a variable for historically black colleges and
universities and tribal colleges. Asian, Hispanic/Latino, and
Women’s colleges will be determined based on their
membership to Asian American and Pacific Islander
Association of Colleges and Universities, Hispanic
Association of Colleges and Universities, and Women’s
College Coalition.
Coded: 1 = serving a minority population, 0 = serving a
general population
NCES contains a variable distinguishing land-grant
institutions.
Coded: 1 = land grant, 0 = not land grant
Annual rankings are published in the U.S. News and World
Report magazines: they include national rankings as well as
regional rankings for universities and colleges.
Scale: 1 – 200, with 1 being highest rank and 200 being
lowest rank or unranked
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Institutional control

Carnegie Classification

Categorical variables based on NCES’s variable for
institutional control has 3 options: public, private non-profit,
and private for-profit.
Coded:
Public will serve as the assumed variable.
Private non-profit coded: 1 = private non-profit and 0 =
public or private for-profit
Private for-profit coded: 1 = private for-profit and 0 =
public or private non-profit
NCES’s variable for Carnegie Classification 2010: Basic with
the following options:
3 Associate's--Public Rural-serving Large
6 Associate's--Public Urban-serving Single Campus
7 Associate's--Public Urban-serving Multicampus
10 Associate's--Private For-profit
12 Associate's--Public 4-year Primarily Associate's
14 Associate's--Private For-profit 4-year Primarily
Associate's
15 Research Universities (very high research activity)
16 Research Universities (high research activity)
17 Doctoral/Research Universities
18 Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs)
19 Master's Colleges and Universities (medium programs)
20 Master's Colleges and Universities (smaller programs)
21 Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences
22 Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields
23 Baccalaureate/Associate's Colleges
24 Theological seminaries, Bible colleges, and other faithrelated institutions
26 Other health professions schools
30 Schools of art, music, and design
Coded:
Research universities 15-17 was the assumed variable
Master’s coded as 1 = 18-20, 0 = all other options
Baccalaureate coded as 1 = 21-23, 0 = all other options
Associate’s coded as 1 = 3-14, 0 = all other options
Special will be coded as 1 = 24-33, 0 = all other options
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Population
More than a quarter of the institutions with social equity missions exist in the
Southeastern region of the United States according to NCES (refer to Figure 3.1).
Therefore, this study focused on four-year, degree-granting institutions in the
Southeastern region of the United States that receive Title IV funding. The implications
of this research have a greater impact on this region more than any other in the country.
More specifically, the institutions met the following criteria:


Have a Carnegie Classification



Hold SACSCOC regional accreditation



Have first-time, full-time degree-seeking students



Offer baccalaureate degrees or higher
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Outlying areas
AS FM GU MH
MP PR PW VI
Far West AK CA
6%
HI NV OR WA
12%

New England CT
ME MA NH RI VT
7%
Mid East DE DC
MD NJ NY PA
13%

Rocky
Mountains CO ID
MT UT WY
5%

Great Lakes IL IN
MI OH WI
11%

Southwest AZ
NM OK TX
9%

Plains IA KS MN
MO NE ND SD
11%

Southeast AL AR
FL GA KY LA MS
NC SC TN VA WV
26%

Figure 3.1

Percentage of the nation’s institutions with social equity missions by
geographic region

The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges
(SACSCOC) serves as the regional accreditor for the Southeastern region; however,
SACSCOC defines the region differently than the federal government. For example,
SACSCOC includes Texas but not West Virginia. Institutions with SACSCOC
accreditation must provide evidence of student learning (SACSCOC, 2011), which is an
aspect that is not captured accurately in any other data source or standardized
examination (e.g., Kuh & Ewell, 2010; Palomba & Banta, 1999; Porter & Whitcomb,
2005). During the 2013-14 academic year, 416 four-year institutions accepted Title IV
funding, had a Carnegie classification, and held SACSCOC accreditation. Of those 416,
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172 (41.3%) had social equity missions. Table 3.2 provides a breakdown of the types of
social equity missions that institutions in the SACSCOC region offered during 2013-14.

Table 3.2

Number of social equity missions in the SACSCOC region.

AfricanInclusive
Asian
Hispanic
Tribal
Women Land Grant
American
Admissions
61
0
3
0
13
25
188
Note: Many institutions support more than one type of social equity mission
Source: NCES, 2013-2014
Sample
To identify the specific institutions for this study, the researcher obtained from the
SACSCOC database of members (2015) the institutions that will undergo reaffirmation in
2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025. These institutions’ last reaffirmation would have been
ten years earlier in the springs of 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. From this list of
institutions, the researcher eliminated institutions classified as Level I, associate’s
degrees. Level I institutions would not have comparable data for this study and would
need their own instrument for evaluation. The resulting compilation provided 241
possible institutions for the study.
Next the researcher accessed the IPEDS Data Center and selected the “compare
institutions” using the final release data option for the 241 SACSCOC institutions. Fortysix institutions were excluded because they were either not in the IPEDS system or they
had incomplete data—leaving 195 institutions for this study. A .csv file was downloaded
from IEPDS containing the institutions’ IPEDS identification numbers and locations of

46

the main campus, making the institutions easier to locate for future data collection. The
complete list of institutions in this study is provided in Appendix A.
The study’s participants were representative of many types of higher education
institutions in the country, and all of them report graduation rates and other governmentrequired, performance-based metrics. The types of institutions include public non-profit,
private non-profit, and for-profit institutions, as well as institutions across the Carnegie
2010 basic classifications. Furthermore, 90 (46.1%) institutions had at least one of the
three types of social equity missions in this study: (1) classified as a land-grant
institution, (2) served a target population, and (3) offered inclusive admissions policies.
Thirty-four institutions had more than one of these types of missions.
Carnegie Classification
One of the most common forms of identifying institutional mission focuses on its
Carnegie Classification (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). Most of the four-year
institutions could be classified as either bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral institutions. A
small number of others could be said to have a special focus, such as a theological
seminary or a law school. Most for-profit institutions have the special classification.
Furthermore, some associate’s institutions offered bachelor’s degree programs and filed
first-time, full-time information with IPEDS. Table 3.3 demonstrates the Carnegie
classifications in this study. The Carnegie Foundation reevaluated its classifications in
2010, and 52 of the institutions altered their statuses. However the differences did not
have much of an effect on the total numbers in each category as indicated in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3

Carnegie Classification for institutions in the study, 2009-2012

Carnegie
Classification*
2009
2010-12

Special**

Associate’s**

Bachelor’s

Master’s

Doctoral

7
5

8
8

68
67

72
73

40
42

* Carnegie 2010 basic classifications are categorized broadly. Refer to Table 3.1 for how
these broad categories were determined.
** Although the study excludes associate’s institutions (or Level I institutions), some
associate’s level institutions offer bachelor’s degrees and meet the criteria for having
first-time, full-time bachelor’s degree seeking students.
Institutional Control
An institution’s affiliation can also provide more insight into its missions. In this
study, the majority of the institutions were private non-profit with a religious affiliation.
A breakdown of institutional control is provided in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4

Breakdown of institutional control

Public Non-Profit
83
(42.6%)

Private Non-Profit
Private Non-Profit
Religious Affiliation Non-religious Affiliation
87
19
(44.6%)
(9.7%)

Private For-Profit
6
(3.1%)

Social Equity Missions
The addition of social equity foci in institutional missions—the centricities—
provides a unique dynamic to this study. For the purposes of this study, three types of
missions were classified as social equity. One mission serves underrepresented
populations, including historically Black institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, and
women’s institutions. In this study, 43 (22.1%) institutions could be classified as serving
a special population. Second, colleges and universities that have inclusive admissions
policies offer more access to students, particularly those who come from low-income
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families and could be considered underprepared for college. Fifty-nine (30.3%) of the
institutions were classified as having inclusive admissions. Finally, land-grant institutions
have a mission to serve the industrial classes and prepare the working class with
opportunities for higher education. This study included ten (5.1%) land-grant institutions.
A total of 81 (41.5%) institutions have at least one social equity mission. Some have
more than one; for example, an institution may be a land grant with inclusive admissions
policies that serves an underrepresented population. Table 3.5 provides information on
the number of institutions that have social equity missions.
Table 3.5

Number of institutions with social equity missions

No social equity
mission
144
(54.5%)

1 social equity
mission
51
(26.1%)

2 social equity
missions
28
(14.4%)
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3 social equity
missions
2
(1.0%)

Missing Data
For three of the institutions in the study, one year of data was excluded. For
example, one institution was struck by a natural disaster in 2005, which prevented it from
enrolling first-time, full-time students. For this reason, a graduation rate could not be
calculated for the 2011 year. Another institution did not have a default rate for 2009;
therefore, an efficiency score could not be calculated. The third institution had missing
data for 2010, but had all data available for 2009, 2011, and 2012. Rather than strike
these institutions completely from the study, the incomplete years for these three
institutions were excluded from the study. None of the missing years overlapped, and
with 194 institutions for those years, the sample was large enough not to be effected by
the omissions.
Time Frame
The original study called for five years of data; however, only four years of data
were available at the time the data were gathered. Most of the financial data, such as the
default rates and expenditures, have a two-year delay after the close of the fiscal year.
The 2013-2014 data will be available in September of 2016. Therefore, the data for the
EPI reflect 2009-2010, 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013.
Need for Confidential Data
All of the data for the EPI are publically available except for the accreditation
evaluations. The presence of this variable not only restricts the dataset to the southeastern
region, but also requires that the data remain unidentifiable outside of institutional
characteristics. Without this variable, the index would be comprised solely of input and
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output data, which are proxies of educational outcomes. The correlation between the
SACSCOC variable and the other effectiveness variables of student-to-faculty ratio,
percentage of full-time faculty, and mission-related expenditures is -.0390, but is not
statistically significant. The lack of a significant correlation means that the accreditation
information does not provide the same information as the other variables in the
effectiveness objective. Excluding the accreditation data would omit a different
perspective on higher education accountability that cannot be replaced by publically
available data.
Procedure
To test the relationship of institutional missions to their performance, this study
developed an index. All data for the index variables were gathered and combined into an
Excel spreadsheet by each institution’s unique IPEDS identifier. The Excel spreadsheet
was used to create the indicators, either as an adjustment to the raw score or as a
percentile rank. The spreadsheet was imported into STATA 14 to first conduct a factor
analysis to determine which indicators would be included in the index. The factor
analysis resulted in three factors, labeled as equity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Within
those factors, ten indicators proved relevant to the study. A discussion of how the index
was created follows in the next section.
The three subscores were generated using a factor-based score calculation. Each
indicator in the factor was added together and divided by the total number of indicators.
The factor-based score approach was more appropriate than calculating weights for this
index because the factor loadings were all very similar to each other and using the
average allowed the indicators to retain their original scales rather than undergo further
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treatments to ensure that all indicators were on the same scale. Finally, a composite EPI
score was created by summing the three subscores for equity, efficiency, and
effectiveness.
In addition to the index development, the researcher gathered data to test the
hypotheses. These data included the results of U.S. News and World Report as traditional
accountability measures, as well as relevant institutional characteristics from NCES to
serve as the study constructs. The discussion of how these data were gathered is
described in the Traditional Accountability Tools and Study Constructs sections
respectively.
Finally, the Hypothesis Testing section describes how linear regressions were
used to evaluate the influence of social equity missions, and to compare the EPI to
traditional rankings. Each regression was tested for autocorrelation, normality,
heteroskedacity, and multicollinearity.
Index Development
An index involves multiple calculations to derive an overall score (refer to Figure
3.2). First, the raw data representing every institution in the study must be gathered for
each metric. Data for this study were obtained from publically accessible databases
within the National Center of Education Statistics’ (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary
Education Dataset (IPEDS) and Federal Student Aid (FSA). The researcher also worked
with the staff of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, Commission on
Colleges (SACSCOC) to obtain data related to student learning to contribute to the
effectiveness metrics. Metrics were then converted to indicators by identifying a target
and evaluating each metric against that target. In most cases, the metric was also the
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target, such as the graduation rate. In other cases, the targets were determined through
each institution’s percentile rank, such as the cost of attendance. For example, an
institution that scores in the 75th percentile will have a metric that is higher than 75% of
the other institutions’ scores; therefore, its indicator score would be 75%.
Data Collection for the Metrics and Indicators
This section describes the variables collected and the source where the data were
obtained. With the exception of data from SACSCOC, all metrics are available from
publically accessible sources. SACSCOC granted permission for the researcher to use
accreditation results as an indicator, and that section of this document explains how the
researcher protected potentially sensitive information. Unless stated otherwise, the value
of each metric was the raw data from the data source. These metrics were then converted
to indicators. Many of the indicators for this study also appear in various performance
reporting already (e.g., Conner & Rabovsky, 2011; Dougherty et al., 2013); others were
gathered based on the researcher’s fifteen years of experience related to institutional
research. Table 3.8 at the end of this section provides a summary of all indicators, and
Appendix B provides a codebook for each metric and indicator.
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EPI Composite Score

Figure 3.2

Efficiency
subscore

Equity
subscore

Effectiveness
subscore

Indicator

Indicator

Indicator

Metric

Metric

Metric

Raw data

Raw data

Raw data

Components to derive the EPI composite score

Indicators often included in performance reporting
Graduation rates: represent the percentage of first-time, full-time, degree-seeking
undergraduate students who receive a baccalaureate degree within six years of their initial
enrollment (NCES, n.d.). Graduation rates are the most commonly used performance
metric (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Conner & Rabovsky, 2011) and are calculated as a
part of U.S. News and World Report rankings. The standardized graduation rates are
tracked and publically available through the IPEDS system.
Undergraduate headcount enrollment: Total number of undergraduate students
who enrolled in the fall semester. This number includes full-time and part-time students,
as well as students classified as freshman, sophomore, junior, and senior. Many statelevel performance agenda utilize these metrics as part of their funding formula (Conner &
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Rabovsky, 2011). Each institution reports annually this number in a standardized format
in the IPEDS system.
Student default rates: The percentage of students in a cohort who took out
federally funded student loans and “who default before the end of the second fiscal year
following the fiscal year in which the borrowers entered repayment” (FSA, 2014).
Student default rates are calculated annually in a standardized method and are reported in
terms of three-year cohorts. These calculations are publically available on the Federal
Student Aid website for all institutions that receive Title IV funding.
Cost of attendance: “Average net price for full-time, first-time degree/certificateseeking undergraduates paying the in-state or in-district tuition rate who received grant or
scholarship aid from federal, state or local governments, or the institution” (NCES, n.d.).
This average factors in the cost for books and supplies, as well as weighted average room
and board expenses. As Derthick and Dunn (2009) as well as others have complained, the
cost remains one of the greatest concerns for lawmakers, and is often the rationale for
performance requirements. Institutions report the net price of attendance as part of their
annual reporting responsibilities through NCES.
Student-to-faculty ratio: The student-to-faculty ratio indicates the number of fulltime equivalent undergraduate students divided by the number of full-time equivalent
undergraduate faculty members. Smaller numbers signal the potential for smaller classes
and greater opportunities for students to interact with the faculty, which Pascarella and
colleagues (2006) lists among good practices of effective undergraduate education. These
ratios are reported annually in NCES.
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Percent full-time faculty: Of the instructional faculty who deliver undergraduate
education, the proportion of those who are full-time demonstrates potential availability to
work with students, as well as institutional commitment to the pedagogical process
(Pascarella et al., 2006). These percentages are reported annually in NCES.
Mission-related expenditures: The percentage of all expenditures that were
devoted to mission-related activities, such as instruction, student support services,
academic support, research, and outreach. The IPEDS Glossary (NCES, n.d.) provides
the following definitions for these categories of expenses:


Instructional expenses include “all operating expenses associated with the
colleges, schools, departments, and other instructional divisions of the
institution and for departmental research and public service that are not
separately budgeted. This would include compensation for academic
instruction… conducted by the teaching faculty for the institution's
students.”



Student support expenses include “admissions, registrar activities, and
activities whose primary purpose is to contribute to students' emotional
and physical well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social
development outside the context of the formal instructional program.
Examples include student activities, cultural events, student newspapers,
intramural athletics, student organizations, supplemental instruction
outside the normal academic program (remedial instruction for example),
career guidance, counseling, financial aid administration, and student
records.”
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Academic support expenses include “operating expenses associated with
activities and services that support the institution's primary missions of
instruction, research, and public service.”



Research-related expenditures are “activities specifically organized to
produce research outcomes and commissioned by an agency either
external to the institution or separately budgeted by an organizational unit
within the institution. The category includes institutes and research centers
and individual and project research.”



Public services expenses include those “associated with activities
established primarily to provide noninstructional services beneficial to
individuals and groups external to the institution. Examples are
conferences, institutes, general advisory services, reference bureaus, and
similar services provided to particular sectors of the community. This
function includes expenses for community services, cooperative extension
services, and public broadcasting services.”

Administrative expenditures: Many critics assert that rising administrative costs
encourage the increased costs in tuition (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2008a; Bowen,
1980). Determined by dividing the total institutional support expenses by the total
expenses. These data are publically available in the IPEDS system. IPEDS defines
institutional support expenses as follows:
The sum of all operating expenses associated with the day-to-day operational
support of the institution. Includes expenses for general administrative services,
central executive-level activities concerned with management and long range
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planning, legal and fiscal operations, space management, employee personnel and
records, logistical services such as purchasing and printing, and public relations
and development (NCES, n.d.).
Equity-inspired indicators not often associated with performance reporting
Considerations for social equity are often neglected from performance
management structures (Frederickson, 1990; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002); however,
this aspect remains important for social mobility (Beller & Hout, 2006; Lucas, 2001). No
aspect of social equity appears in U.S. News and World Report rankings (U.S. News and
World Report, 2014). All equity metrics were obtained from IPEDS.
Proportion of Pell-grant students: The percentage of first-time, full-time degreeseeking undergraduate students who received Pell grants. Students who are eligible for
Pell grants must meet need-based criteria according to the federal government’s
qualifications. Several researchers, including those at the U.S. Department of Education,
find that as the proportion of Pell-grant students rise, the graduation rates decline
(Mettler, 2014; Torche, 2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2006).
Cost of attendance for low-income students: Average net price for students paying
in-state tuition, who received Title IV federal student aid, and whose family income is
between $0-$30,000. Although, an institution may have a high average net cost of
attendance, it may offer lower prices for students from low-income families.
Debt burden as a proportion of the total cost: “Average amount of student loans
received by full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students”
(NCES, n.d.). This average includes federal subsidized and unsubsidized loans, as well as
all institution or privately sponsored loans. Looking at the total amount borrowed does
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not tell the complete story for some institutions. For example, many students often
borrow more money than is needed to cover the cost of attendance. Students who borrow
20% or less of the total cost may not seem as disadvantaged as those who borrow 200%
of the total cost of attendance.
Proportion of student body that takes out loans: “Percentage of full-time, firsttime degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who received student loans.”
(NCES, n.d.). These loans include “all monies that must be repaid to the lending
institution, including Title IV subsidized and subsized loans and all institutionally- and
privately-sponsored loans” (NCES, n.d.). This metric combined with the proportion of
the cost that the students borrow indicates the level of access the institution provides to
low-income students. Highly selective institutions attract more affluent students, and they
would have fewer students who take out smaller loans. On the other hand, an institution
that serves low-income students would ideally have lower tuition, so even though a high
proportion of the student body would have to take out loans, those loans would be
relatively small.
Many researchers have found that structural diversity in both the student body and
the faculty at the college or university contributes to students’ growth in academics
(particularly with regard to critical thinking) and their abilities to interact with those who
are different from themselves (Astin, 1993; Denson & Chang, 2009; G. R. Pike & Kuh,
2006). Chang (1999) describes structural diversity as the proportion of races and ethnicity
in the student body, as opposed to the number of minority students. Structural diversity in
this way prevents Historical Black Colleges and Universities and other institutions with
special populations from skewing the data.
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Structural racial/ethnic diversity of graduating students: Ideally, the structural
racial/ethnic diversity of the graduates would mimic the structural diversity of the overall
undergraduate student body. If any one group of students tends to fail in this area, then
the institution may want to address this deficiency. Furthermore, any shortcomings in this
area could signal a problem in the campus climate for certain populations (Denson &
Chang, 2009; Hurtado, Milem, & Clayton-Pedersen, 1999). Therefore, to calculate this
metric, the structural racial/ethnic diversity of the undergraduate student body would be
determined in terms of proportions of African-American, Asian (including Pacific
Islander), Latino, Native American, and White (e.g., 13%, 20%, 2%, 65% or 80%, 0%,
20%, 0%). That ratio would then be compared to the structural diversity of the students
who graduated to determine how closely the graduating students represent the overall
student body.
Gender diversity of faculty: As with racial/ethnic diversity, the faculty must
represent the genders of the student body. The proportion of females will be compared
between the faculty and the student body.
Unfortunately, ethnic and racial diversity of the faculty is not available through
IPEDS. Institutions could complete that data optionally, and most of the small, private
schools opted not to complete that data. All institutions were required to provide this type
of information for their faculty beginning in 2012, and therefore future research could
include this indicator.
Proportion of degrees awarded to female students: Bastedo and Bowman (2010,
2011) found that as institutions increased selectivity, the proportion of females in the
student body declined.
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Proportion of degrees awarded to minority students: Finally, as prior literature
asserts, efficient institutions tend attract and enroll a homogenous group of affluent white
students (Bastedo & Bowman, 2010; Mettler, 2014). This measure seeks to balance
heterogeneity with selectivity.
Effectiveness-inspired indicators not often associated with performance reporting
As many higher education accountability critics lament, the performance metrics
and ranking systems do not capture elements of effective teaching and learning (Bok,
2008; Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006; Zemsky, 2007). This EPI incorporates indicators from
one of the regional accrediting bodies, whose role it is to ensure educational quality and
effectiveness (Eaton, 2012; Wheelan, 2013). Thus, the inclusion of effectiveness seeks to
add a new perspective to higher education accountability.
Accreditation standards: SACSCOC reaffirmation occurs in three phases: Off-site
committee review of the self-study documentation, On-site committee review that visits
the institution to ensure compliance, and Commission’s Board of Trustees review
(SACSCOC, 2011, pp. 8–9). This study features the results of the on-site review for
selected accreditation standards that feature student learning and student achievement.
Student learning outcomes are defined as what academic programs want their
graduates to think, know, or do, student learning outcomes directly reflect the
effectiveness of the student’s education (Palomba & Banta, 1999). These outcomes,
however, cannot be standardized easily, because they must be related to the individual
institution’s mission, student characteristics, and other relevant but potentially unique
features (Barton, 2010). Because of this lack of standardization, measuring this form of
effectiveness becomes extremely difficult.
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Student learning outcomes are evaluated as part of the accreditation process, but
those results are not available to the public. For the purposes of developing the EPI, a
calculated variable was created out of a combined 18 SACSCOC (2011) standards that
focus on student learning or practices that theoretically support student learning: CR 2.5
Institutional effectiveness (p. 18), CR 2.8 Number of full-time faculty (p. 20), CR 2.9
Learning resources and services (p. 20), CR 2.10 Student support services (p. 20), CR
2.12 Quality Enhancement Plan (p. 21), CS 3.3.1.1 Student learning outcomes for
educational programs (p. 27), CS 3.3.1.2 outcomes for administrative support services (p.
27), CS 3.3.1.3 outcomes for academic and student support services (p. 27), CS 3.3.2
Goals and Assessment of the Quality Enhancement Plan (p. 27), CS 3.4.9 Academic
support services (p. 29), CS 3.4.11 Academic program coordination (p. 29), CS 3.4.12
Technology use to enhance student learning (p. 29), CS 3.5.4 Terminal degrees of faculty
(p. 30), CS 3.7.1 Faculty qualifications and competence (p. 30), CS 3.8.1
Learning/information resources (p. 31), and CS 3.8.2 Instruction of library use (p. 31).
Student achievement in the areas of college competencies and national outcomes
are also evaluated as part of the accreditation process. For the purposes of developing the
EPI, a calculated variable will be created out of combined SACSCOC standards.
SACSCOC (2011) identifies these standards as follows: CS 3.5.1 General Education
Competencies or the proportion of education not focused on skills, techniques, and
discipline specific courses (p. 29) and FR 4.1 Student Achievement (p. 39).
To prevent individual institutions from being identified by these specific
requirements, the results of these 18 standards were combined into one metric. If the
institution was in compliance with the standard during either the most recently completed
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decennial certification or the fifth-year interim review, then it would receive a 1 for that
standard. If it was not in compliance, then it would receive a 0 for that standard. The total
possible score for this metric would be 18 and the lowest possible score would be 0. The
indicator for this metric was the total score divided by 18.
Percentage of the student body who graduate: Rather than focusing on the
efficiency with which students graduate, this measure determines what proportion of the
student body completes degrees. This metric would capture students who transferred into
the school at any point, those who took classes on a part-time basis, and any others who
are not considered first-time, full-time students. These data are publically available
through the IPEDS system.
Index Creation
All of the indicators listed in the previous section were included in the original
factor analysis. Several of the indicators dropped out of the index, and therefore the factor
analysis was repeated with the ones that had relevance to the index. The results of the
principal component factor identified three factors as indicated in Table 3.6. These three
factors were then labeled as equity, efficiency, and effectiveness, respectively.
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Table 3.6

Results of factor analysis: Variance explained

Factor
Eigenvalue
Difference
Proportion
Cumulative
Factor1
3.52757
1.21533
0.3528
0.3528
Factor2
2.31224
1.18394
0.2312
0.5840
Factor3
1.12830
0.14703
0.1128
0.6968
Factor4
0.98127
0.35453
0.0981
0.7949
Factor5
0.62674
0.12166
0.0627
0.8576
Factor6
0.50508
0.10756
0.0505
0.9081
Factor7
0.39752
0.09083
0.0398
0.9479
Factor8
0.30669
0.16148
0.0307
0.9785
Factor9
0.14522
0.07585
0.0145
0.9931
Factor10
0.06937
.
0.0069
1.0000
Note: principal component factor (unrotated)
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(45) = 4062.80 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
The indicators for each factor were determined by their factor scores, which
involved an orthogonal varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. Nine indicators were
retained because they had factor scores over 0.6. A tenth indicator for adjusted
administrative expenses was also included even though its factor score was .59. The
alpha score for the third factor was notably higher at 0.4636 when it was included than
when it was excluded at 0.0823. These results of the rotation are displayed in Table 3.7.
Based on the three factors, subscores for equity, efficiency, and effectiveness were
created by adding the indicators that loaded in those factors and dividing the sum by the
number of indicators. With factor scores similar to one another, weights would not alter
the subscore much.
The Cronbach’s alpha was used to test the reliability of the subscores (see Table 3.8). For
the first two factors, related to equity and efficiency, the alpha scores are excellent at
0.8748 and 0. 7982 respectively. On the other hand, the alpha for effectiveness is weaker
at 0.4636, but not low enough to reject the reliability altogether. This weaker score for
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effectiveness indicates that caution should be taken when drawing conclusions about how
this subscore relates to higher education institutions.
A summary of the EPI is provided in Table 3.9. This table indicates the three
factors of the EPI and the ten indicators within those factors. Additionally, the table
provides the source of the data for the indicators. A more detailed codebook of these
indicators are provided in Appendix B.

Table 3.7

Factor scores of principal component factor (rotated component matrix)
Variable

Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Uniqueness
Equity
Efficiency Effectiveness
Graduation Rate
0.7600
-0.2485
0.1195
0.3463
Default rates
0.8421
-0.0206
0.2073
0.2474
Proportion of bachelor’s degrees -0.7982
-0.0844
0.1353
0.3374
awarded to minorities
Proportion of Pell grants in
-0.9245
0.0750
-0.1055
0.1285
student body
Cost of attendance
-0.2605
0.9153
0.0221
0.0939
Cost of attendance for low0.0249
0.9323
0.0893
0.1222
income families
Amount of student loan
0.3152
0.6607
-0.1443
0.4433
SACSCOC
-0.1285
0.0125
0.6775
0.5243
Mission expenses
0.3440
-0.0439
0.6343
0.4774
Administrative expenses
0.5088
0.2850
0.5907
0.3110
Note: Rotation method: orthogonal varimax with Kaiser normalization
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Table 3.8
Factor

Factor 1:
Equity

Cronbach’s alpha scores for the indicators in each of the three factors
Item

Sign

Item-test
correlatio
n

Item-rest
correlatio
n

Graduation rate

-

0.8212

0.6791

Average
inter-item
correlatio
n
0.6716

Default rate

-

0.8650

0.7516

0.6218

Bachelor’s
degrees to
minorities
Pell grants

+

0.7903

0.6300

0.7067

+

0.9339

0.8732

0.5435

Test scale
Factor 2:
Cost of
Efficienc
attendance
Cost of
y
attendance for
low-income
families
Loan amounts

0.6359
+

0.8904

0.7365

0.4515

+

0.9219

0.8058

0.3717

+

0.7199

0.4241

0.8831

Test scale
Factor 3:
SACSCOC
Effective
-ness
Mission
expenditures
Administrative
expenditures
Test scale

0.5687
+

0.5572

0.0926

0.5100

+

0.7452

0.3697

0.1181

+

0.7813

0.4348

0.0429
0.2237

Note: Test scale = mean (standardized items)
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Alpha

0.859
8
0.831
4
0.878
5
0.781
3
0.874
8
0.622
1
0.541
9
0.937
9
0.798
2
0.675
5
0.211
2
0.082
3
0.463
6

Table 3.9

EPI indicators with data sources, listed by factor

Index Weight

33.3%

33.3%

33.3%

Factor

Equity

Efficiency

Effectiveness

Indicator
Graduation rate
Student default rate
Percent of bachelor’s degrees to
minority students
Pell grant students
Amount of student loans
Cost of attendance
Cost of attendance for low-income
students
Student learning outcomes
Mission-related expenditures
Administration-related expenditures

Indicator
source
IPEDS
FSA
IPEDS
IPEDS
IPEDS
IPEDS
IPEDS
SACSCOC
IPEDS
IEPDS

Traditional Accountability Tools
To test its effectiveness as an accountability tool, this research compared an
institution’s EPI composite score to its U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) rankings.
Data were obtained from the USNWR magazines that are published annually. Although
most rankings data are available publically through USNWR web sites, the magazines
contain more detailed information. Rankings for national universities, national liberal arts
colleges, regional universities, and regional colleges are listed as 1 being the highest rank
to 200 being the lowest rank. Institutions that do not require admissions tests are not
ranked because their data are not available for USNWR selectivity metrics. These
institutions are excluded from the third hypothesis, but are included in the first two
hypotheses.
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Study Constructs
The independent variables for this study relate to institutions’ social equity
missions in terms of targeting special populations, offering inclusive admissions, and
holding land grant status. This study considers the following special populations:
African-American/Black, Asian (including Pacific Islands), Hispanic/Latino, Native
American, and Women. NCES includes variables to identify historically black colleges
and universities and tribal colleges; however, the U.S. Department of Education does not
monitor or track status for Asian, Hispanic, or Women’s serving institutions. These
designations are determined based on institutional membership in their respective
national organizations. Asian-serving institutions, determined through membership with
the Asian American and Pacific Islander Association of Colleges and Universities, have a
student enrollment with 10% or more Asian American or Pacific Islander students
(APIACU, n.d.). Hispanic-serving institutions are recognized by their membership with
the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities and by having a total Hispanic
enrollment of 25% or more of the total enrollment (HACU, n.d.). Finally, Women’s
institutions belong to the Women’s College Coalition. Although the majority of
institutions across the United States enroll more women than men, women’s institutions
offer specific missions to serve this population (WCC, 2015). With the compilation of
institutions from these sources, including NCES, this study identified institutions that
serve specific populations.
Furthermore, identifying data for land-grant institutions and institutions with
inclusive admissions processes are available through NCES. The admissions processes
are signaled through a variable called Undergraduate Profile, which designates
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admissions processes as inclusive, selective, and more selective. These designations
along with institutions that have missions to serve special populations constitute the
social equity missions.
Additionally, institutions’ scores in the traditional accountability mechanisms
served as independent variables to test the effectiveness of the new instrument. For the
third hypothesis, the U.S. News and World Report ranking will serve as the independent
variable.
The EPI served as the dependent variable in this study. The first hypothesis used
the equity subscore as the dependent variable to test the existing assumptions that
institutions with social equity missions would have lower efficiency scores. The
remaining two hypotheses utilized the composite EPI score as the dependent variable.
To help isolate the relationship of EPI to institutions, control variables were
necessary to limit potential external influence. These control variables included the
institutions’ control (public, private non-profit, and private for-profit) and Carnegie
classification (Research, Master’s, Baccalaureate, and Special). These variables
commonly serve as controls in prior research (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2008b;
Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014; U.S. Department of Education, 2006). All of these
variables are publically available in IPEDS.
Hypothesis testing
To test the three hypotheses for this research design, all indicators were grouped
into three subcategories: equity, efficiency, and effectiveness. The first hypothesis
utilized a linear regression to determine the influence of any institutional mission on its
composite EPI score. Ideally, this hypothesis would determine whether the new
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instrument evaluates institutions on higher education objectives without punishing any
particular centricity, thereby preventing discrimination against institutions with social
equity missions. The second hypothesis also employed a linear regression to measure the
influence of social equity missions on the graduation rate. This hypothesis tested the
assumption that institutions with social equity missions would have lower performance
scores.
The last hypothesis required linear regressions to assess the EPI’s effectiveness.
For H3, the composite EPI score was analyzed with the score of U.S. News and World
Reports, the traditional measure of institutional success. If the traditional academic rating
scores are not related to the EPI, then more research could further develop this instrument
as an accountability tool.
Limitations
The primary limitation for this research is its lack of participation among the
various higher education stakeholders during its creation. Although, a thorough literature
review identified the weaknesses of the current performance models and some variables
that based on theoretical contributions, more discourse is needed to ensure mutual
agreement among the multiple perspectives. The intent of this research is to propose a
new instrument for consideration and to explore whether the outcomes of a polycentric
system could be measured in a more inclusive manner rather than in the existing narrow
processes. Ideally, the proposed EPI could start a meaningful conversation, and input
from multiple stakeholders could improve its structure.
With reference to the data points, this research cannot verify the accuracy of the
data within the original data sources. The United States Department of Education does
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not conduct audits of the data in the IPEDS system, and therefore, the value of this
proposed EPI relies on the quality of the data as they were entered into the databases.
Furthermore, some of the indicators suggested for this study could be considered proxies
rather than direct measures of efficiency, equity, and effectiveness. In its current form,
the EPI must rely on the data that are available, and future work could help improve the
instrument’s accuracy and reliability.
Delimitations
Finally, this study intentionally narrows the institutions in the study to focus on
four-year institutions from the southeastern region of the United States. The researcher
has twelve years’ experience and connections with the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools, Commission on Colleges, and therefore, those data are more readily
attainable. Caution must be taken when generalizing the results of the hypotheses,
because these results may not represent all colleges and universities. However, the results
of this study could determine whether future research could expand to a national setting.
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DATA ANALYSIS
The results of building a new education performance index (EPI) supported two
of the hypotheses, and partially supported the third hypothesis. Institutions’
characteristics such as Carnegie Classification and admissions selectivity were strongly
related to graduation rates, a popular metric used to evaluate performance. If graduation
rates were used alone to evaluate higher education, then those institutions with social
equity missions would be adversely affected. The EPI scores were less influenced by
institutions’ characteristics, and those schools with social equity missions were either not
affected or positively affected by the results. Finally, the relationship between the EPI
and U.S. News and World Report rankings was significant for regional colleges, but not
for regional universities.
Overview of Analysis
This study used three linear regressions to test the hypotheses. The researcher
gathered most of the data from publically available data sources, and the SACSCOC data
were entered by one of the agency’s staff members. After the SACSCOC employee
entered the data, he then created unique identifiers for the institutions and stripped their
names from the dataset so as to protect their identities. All data were sorted in an Excel
spreadsheet and then imported into STATA, version 14.
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The variables for the study compare aspects of the newly formed EPI to
institutional characteristics. Independent variables included the various indicators for
mission: Carnegie Classification, institutional control, and social equity missions. An
additional independent variable for U.S. News and World Report’s College Rankings was
added to the third hypothesis. For Hypotheses One and Three, the composite EPI score
served as the dependent variable. The dependent variable for Hypothesis Two was the
graduation rate, the most widely used performance indicator. In all of the regressions,
institutions with Carnegie classifications of special or associate’s were excluded from the
models because their inclusion created non-normal, heteroskedastic results; however,
including all of the institutions did not change the overall conclusion of the hypotheses.
Analysis for Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis sought to evaluate whether the newly developed EPI would
control for institutional characteristics, particularly those associated with social equity
missions. With the addition of equity measures and effectiveness measures, the EPI
encompasses a broader concept of accountability. Ideally, the EPI would not be
influenced by institutions’ social equity missions, unlike prevalent performance metrics.
The results of the first regression support Hypothesis One as demonstrated in
Table 4.1. In this regression, public, research institutions with more selective admissions
practices are the constant. Institutions’ selectivity had no significant influence on the
composite score, and those that serve underrepresented populations have a higher
coefficient than more selective, public, research institutions. Furthermore, land-grant
institutions have significantly higher coefficients than non-land grants. Carnegie
Classification had no influence on the EPI score, indicated by the lack of significance for
73

the master’s and bachelor’s levels. Both private and for-profit institutions scored
significantly lower than public institutions.
Table 4.1

Regression analysis of the EPI and institutional characteristics

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIFs
Constant
203.9634
2.028316
100.56
0.000***
Private
-36.45399
1.583195
-23.03
0.000***
1.53
For-profit
-63.1829
6.275594
-10.07
0.000***
1.07
Master’s
-3.20492
1.793939
-1.79
0.074
1.93
Bachelor’s
-1.211291
2.123199
-0.57
0.569
2.62
Inclusive
2.679172
2.111229
1.27
0.205
2.47
Selective
9165966
1.82426
0.50
0.616
2.07
Land grant
-1.346223
3.071041
-0.44
0.661
1.23
Population
16.77547
1.734949
9.67
0.000***
1.31
Dependent variable = EPI, N = 722; R2 = 0.5481; Adj. R2 = 0.5431; F (8, 714) = 108.26,
Prob > F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.78; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity: p = 0.8425; Shapiro-Wilk W: p = 0.03195; Durbin-Watson = 0.7658
***p < .001
A histogram of the EPI score (see Figure 4.1) reveals a fairly symmetric,
unimodal pattern, following a generally expected distribution with a few abnormalities.
Several diagnostic tests were run on this regression, including multicollinearity,
heteroskedasticity, normality, and autocorrelation. The model had no multicollinearity as
indicated by the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.78, and none of the
independent variables had a VIF higher than 2.62 (refer to Table 4.1). A test for
heteroskedasticity was also reassuring because its probability was 0.8425. The other two
tests had a few initial problems, however. The Shapiro-Wilk W test failed to support that
the data were normal, and the Durbin-Watson test also indicated likely autocorrelation in
the regression.
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Figure 4.1

Histogram of the EPI dependent variable

An analysis on the inter-quartile range (IQR) within the data revealed six mild
outliers as contributing to the normality problems. Two instances were low and the other
four were high. The two low institutions occurred with public, research-level schools
with selective admissions. Three of the four high outliers institutions were private,
bachelor’s level schools with inclusive admissions. The fourth was a master’s level,
public school with selective admissions. When these six institutions were excluded, the
Shapiro-Wilk W test failed to reject that the data were normal with a significance of
0.08694. The same regression for the first hypothesis was re-run without the six outliers,
and the results are provided in Table 4.2. With a normal data set, the adjusted R2 moved
from 58.2% to 60.1%. The only change with the normal dataset is that the master’s level
institutions were significantly lower than research institutions, while none of the Carnegie
Classifications had any significance in the original model.

75

Table 4.2

Regression analysis of the EPI and institutional characteristics, excluding
the six outliers

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIFs
Constant
205.5788
1.895077
108.48
0.000***
Private
-37.53507
1.478039
-25.40
0.000***
1.51
For-profit
-62.77882
5.834628
-10.76
0.000***
1.07
Master’s
-3.923809
1.685453
-2.33
0.020*
1.93
Bachelor’s
-3.419254
1.98857
-1.72
0.086
2.57
Inclusive
1.564652
1.972553
0.79
0.428
2.43
Selective
.9364464
1.701291
0.55
0.582
2.03
Land grant
-2.669588
2.859519
-0.93
0.351
1.23
Population
17.12609
1.630213
10.51
0.000***
1.31
2
2
Dependent variable = EPI, N = 704; R = 0.6006; Adj. R = 0.6051; F (8, 696) = 133.33,
Prob > F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.76; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity: p = 0.3178; Shapiro-Wilk W: p = 0.08694
***p < .001 *p < .05

To adjust for the issues with autocorrelation, a threshold generalized
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (TGARCH) model was used (see Table 4.3).
This test corrected for serial correlation and moved the R2 from 54.8% to 72.2%. The
Durbin-Watson test moved from 0.7658 to 1.9426, which means autocorrelation is
unlikely. The primary difference in findings between this model and the original one
depicted in Table 4.1 is that institutions with inclusive admissions have significantly
higher EPI scores than institutions with selective or more selective admissions standards.
As in all of the models for the first hypothesis, private and for-profit institutions have
significantly lower scores than public institutions, and institutions that serve
underrepresented populations have significantly higher scores than their counterparts. No
other institutional characteristic has significant impact on the scores.
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Table 4.3

TGARCH analysis of the EPI and institutional characteristics

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIFs
Constant
204.2453
2.5963
78.67
0.000***
Private
-36.1964
1.4370
-25.19
0.000***
1.51
For-profit
-72.6513
6.1349
-11.84
0.000***
1.07
Master’s
-3.2701
3.0178
-1.08
0.279
1.93
Bachelor’s
-2.3525
3.0307
-0.78
0.438
2.57
Inclusive
5.2202
1.6863
3.10
0.002**
2.43
Selective
0.3663
1.5494
0.24
0.813
2.03
Land grant
-4.6420
2.5924
-1.79
0.073
1.23
Population
14.6470
1.3269
11.04
0.000***
1.31
Dependent variable = EPI, N = 721; R2 = 0.7219; F (8, 713) = 176.68, Prob > F = 0.000
***p < .001 **p < .01

The diagnostic tests indicate that the large sample of institutions vary widely
among the institutional types. Removing the outliers results in normal error distribution
in the regression, but the findings change for bachelor’s level institutions compared to the
inferences drawn from the original model. Furthermore, the original model tested positive
for autocorrelation, making the predictive nature more difficult in volatile higher
education arenas. A TGARCH model corrected for the serial correlation, but again the
findings were different from the original model in that inclusive institutions would have
significantly higher EPI scores than other forms of admissions standards. Such results
overcorrect for that specific type of social equity mission. More research is needed to
fine-tune the variables within the EPI; however, the sample for this study focuses on
about 20% of the institutions in the southeastern region, which comprises an even smaller
proportion of the institutions in the United States. As more data points from other
institutions and regions are incorporated into the model, some of these deficiencies could
correct themselves or worsen. Regardless, the initial findings provide promising evidence
that the EPI controls for different types of institutional missions, thereby preserving
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institutional diversity, and would serve as an alternative to the current use of narrow
performance measures.
Critics (e.g., Moynihan et al., 2011; Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002) of
performance mechanisms often cite concerns with focusing on input to output
comparisons rather than evaluating longer-term, mission-related outcomes. By focusing
on what can be counted and evaluated numerically, institutions may neglect to evaluate
the fulfillment of their missions. Such concerns echo the facts versus value debates that
Simon and Waldo grabbled with. Waldo (2006) feared that a preoccupation with
efficiency and economy often neglected the social values that are important to society.
Even Simon (1997) admitted that input to output comparisons in the search for
quantifiable measures often result in “satisficing” tangible economic objectives in lieu of
abstract value premises (p. 252), but such measures do not provide a complete picture.
The results of the EPI test suggest that the newly developed instrument does
control for most mission-related characteristics. Institutional control continues to
influence the EPI results, but those same characteristics would affect traditional
performance metrics regardless as well be described in Hypotheses Two and Three. With
an adjusted R2 of 57.6%, the institutional characteristics do explain a large portion of the
variations in the EPI score; however, those variations do not adversely affect institutions
with social equity missions. Such considerations for mission-related characteristics,
particularly those missions focused on social equity, preserve institutional diversity
(Harris, 2013). The preservation of institutional diversity follows the polycentric theory
that Ostrom (1973, 2007) and colleagues (1961) advanced to allow for multiple,
overlapping jurisdictions. With the institutional characteristics or missions forming the
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centricities, each type provides a different approach to higher education whether in focus
of academic programs as identified by Carnegie Classification or by access to education
as identified by the level of selectivity in admissions. Furthermore, the tolerance in the
EPI for different social equity missions echo the spirit of Frederickson (1980, 1990) who
sought public policies informed by concepts of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity.
Analysis for Hypothesis Two
To test underlying assumptions of how all of the types of institutions perform in
commonly used accountability measures, the second hypothesis compares institutions’
graduation rate to the mission-related independent variables. More specifically, this
hypothesis tests whether institutions with social equity missions have lower performance
subscores than their counterparts. The graduation rate is recognized as the most
commonly used indicator to assess an institution’s success (Conner & Rabovsky, 2011;
McLendon et al., 2006). Many accountability mechanisms focus heavily on graduation
rates, which many critics argue do not provide a complete picture of institutional
performance (Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, 2012). In
particular, Hamrick and colleagues (2004) and Kuh and Pascarella (2004) assert that
graduation rates are determined by institutional characteristics, not good practices of
effective education; therefore, graduation rates do not accurately measure the true
outcome of higher education.
The results for the second regression support Hypothesis Two as indicated by
Table 4.4. Public, research institutions that are more selective in admissions remain the
constant as with the first regression. Private non-profit institutions had significantly
higher graduation rates, while for-profit institutions had no significant difference.
79

Institutional admissions selectivity seems to have the most influence in graduation rates
with selective admissions practices scoring significantly lower than more selective
institutions, and inclusive admissions practices scoring even lower than selective
institutions. The results for selectivity variables also support prior literature, suggesting
that graduation rates are more indicative of an institution’s level of access than its
effectiveness (Kuh & Pascarella, 2004; Pascarella et al., 2006). Interestingly, Carnegie
Classification does not significantly influence graduation rates, most likely as a result of
controlling for selectivity. Finally, land-grant institutions have significantly higher scores
than their non land-grant counterparts, but institutions that serve underrepresented
populations have significantly lower graduation rates than those serving a general
population. With an adjusted R2 of 57.8%, the model explains over half of the variance in
graduation rates.
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Table 4.4

Regression analysis of graduation rates and institutional characteristics

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIFs
Constant
67.79138
1.245714
54.42
0.000***
Private
5.706456
0.97869
5.83
0.000***
1.53
For-profit
8.065719
3.881388
2.08
0.038*
1.07
Master’s
-5.508241
1.107971
-4.97
0.000***
1.93
Bachelor’s
-6.183876
1.312243
-4.71
0.000***
2.62
Inclusive
-31.0144
1.303455
-23.79
0.000***
2.47
Selective
-16.84288
1.124851
-14.97
0.000***
2.07
Land grant
7.095293
1.896694
3.74
0.000***
1.23
Population
-3.458036
1.072305
-3.22
0.001**
1.31
Dependent variable = graduation rate, N= 723; R2 = 0.5824; Adj. R2 = 0.5777; F (8, 715)
= 124.64; Prob > F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.78; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity: p = 0.7025; Shapiro-Wilk W test: p < .001; Durbin-Watson = 0.9465
***p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05

As with the first hypothesis, the histogram of the graduation rate indicates a
unimodal pattern, with some clear outliers or variations (refer to Figure 4.2). The same
diagnostic tests were run for this regression as with the first regression, including tests for
multicollinearity, normality, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. Because the same
institutions and dataset were used in the first hypothesis as with the second hypothesis,
the conclusions of all the diagnostic tests were the same. This model has no issues with
collinearity or heteroskedasticity; however, troubles arise with normality and
autocorrelation.
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Figure 4.2

Histogram for graduation rate

A more in-depth analysis of the normality issues with this model indicate fifteen
mild outliers and two severe outliers. The majority of the outliers are on the high side as
indicated in Table 4.5 below. Most of the outliers are private, bachelor’s level institutions
that tend to have higher graduation rates than their counterparts. One for-profit and one
public institution has abnormally high graduation rates. No other pattern is apparent from
the level of selectivity in admissions. When these outliers are excluded from the model
that tests graduation rates against institutional characteristics, much of the same
conclusions can be drawn from the data (refer to Table 4.6). In this case, for-profit
institutions had no significant effect on graduation rates. Private and land-grant
institutions have significantly higher graduation rates, while all other institutional
characteristics have significantly lower scores. In particular, inclusive institutions have
dramatically lower coefficients than any other predictor. The adjusted R2 moved from
57.8% in the original model to 68.8%.
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Table 4.5

Inter-quartile range indicating the outliers for the regression testing
graduation rates against institutional characteristics
Mild outliers
Severe
outliers

Table 4.6

Low
4 (0.55%)
1 (0.14%)

High
11 (1.52%)
1

(0.14%)

Regression analysis of graduation rates and institutional characteristics,
excluding outliers

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIFs
Constant
70.04938
1.052354
66.56
0.000***
Private
5.622043
.8178088
6.87
0.000***
1.53
For-profit
-7.632609
4.457824
-1.71
0.087
1.07
Master’s
-6.44059
.9314474
-6.91
0.000***
1.93
Bachelor’s
-7.175555
1.103139
-6.50
0.000***
2.62
Inclusive
-32.79244
1.139985
-28.77
0.000***
2.47
Selective
-19.06762
.9564987
-19.93
0.000***
2.07
Land grant
5.658072
1.577337
3.59
0.000***
1.23
Population
-2.353169
.9636848
-2.44
0.015*
1.31
Dependent variable = graduation rate, N = 680; R2 = 0.6916; Adj. R2 = 0.6879; F (8, 671)
= 188.12; Prob > F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.78; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity: p = 0.6502; Shapiro-Wilk W test: p = 0.47690
***p < .001 * p < .05
Another TGARCH corrected for autocorrelation in the graduation rate model (see
Table 4.7). The revised model moved the R2 from 58.2% to 70.8%, and the DurbinWatson score moved from 0.9465 to 1.9935. Much like with the full graduation rate
model and the model with no outliers, the TGARCH resulted in the same conclusions that
private and land-grant institutions had significantly higher graduation rates than their
counterparts, while all other institutional characteristics had significantly lower scores.
Despite all of the corrections for normality and autocorrelation, all models of graduation
rates explain the same variance and significance. As predicted by prior research
(Archibald & Feldman, 2008b; Hamrick et al., 2004; U.S. Department of Education,
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2006), graduation rates are as much a sign of institutional performance as they are
institutional characteristics and student-level inputs.
Table 4.7

TGARCH regression of graduation rates and institutional characteristics

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIFs
Constant
64.4269
1.8099
35.60
0.000***
Private
7.3506
0.8393
8.76
0.000***
1.53
For-profit
7.9891
2.1624
3.69
0.000***
1.07
Master’s
-5.2926
1.9186
-2.76
0.006**
1.93
Bachelor’s
-7.8234
1.9785
-3.95
0.000***
2.62
Inclusive
-24.9445
1.0311
-24.19
0.000***
2.47
Selective
-14.0982
0.8831
-15.96
0.000***
2.07
Land grant
10.3412
2.7546
3.75
0.000***
1.23
Population
-6.5171
0.8532
-7.64
0.001**
1.31
Dependent variable = graduation rate, N = 723; R2 = 0.7078; F (8, 715) = 124.64; Prob >
F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.78; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity:
p = 0.2333; Shapiro-Wilk W test: p = 0.49001
***p < .001 ** p < .01
It may be a priori to suggest that an institution with higher graduation rates would
have lower social equity indicators and vice-versa (e.g., McLendon et al., 2006; U.S.
Department of Education, 2006); however, this research supports that assumption. As
Figure 4.3 indicates, graduation rates have a negative relationship with the proportion of
Pell grant students. The correlation between the two is -70.7%, which is significant at less
than .001 level. Both of these variables appear together in the equity factor, with
graduation rate having a negative factor score compared to the positive Pell grant ratios.
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Scatterplot and fitted line depicting the tradeoff between graduation rates
and the proportion of Pell grant students

Note: Pearson’s correlation = -.7071, significant at the less than .01 level (2-tailed)
Related to the comparison between graduation rates and Pell grant students,
similar patterns are found with relationships between graduation rates and costs. As
graduation rates increased, the cost of attendance also increased. Likewise, cost of
attendance is negatively associated with Pell grant students, thus, as costs decrease, the
number of Pell grant students increase. The comparison between Pell grant students and
cost of attendance for low-income students was also negative, but not significantly
related (refer to Figure 4.4). In the development of the EPI, the efficiency subscore was
calculated using cost percentiles, depicting low cost institutions in the higher percentiles.
Therefore, graduation rates would be negatively associated with efficiency while the
proportion of Pell grant students would be positively associated (refer to Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.4

Cost of
attendance
for lowincome
families

Cost of
attendance

Pearson correlation = -.029, sig. > .05

Pearson correlation = -.338, sig. < .01

Pell Grant

Scatterplots with fitted lines depicting graduation rates and proportions of Pell grants with costs

Pearson correlation = .103, sig. < .01

Pearson correlation = .385, sig. < .01

Graduation Rate
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Figure 4.5

Scatterplots with fitted lines depicting graduation rates and proportions of Pell grants with efficiency and
effectiveness

A debate remains about whether proportions of low-income students are the same
measures as proportions of minority students. Some researchers equate proportions of
minority with proportions of low-income students (e.g., Wood, n.d.), and others suggest
that these measures may be related (particularly in the southeastern region), but are not
necessarily the same (Carnevale & Rose, 2003; Sirin, 2005). In this study, the proportion
of Pell grant students does have a strong positive relationship to minority students, but
the Pearson correlation is 71.5%, which is significant at the .01 level (see Figure 4.6).
Despite the strong correlation, the two variables are not exactly the same. Therefore,
comparisons on the relationships between graduation rates and minority students are
warranted. A Pearson’s correlation indicates a relatively strong, negative, significant
relationship between graduation rates and the proportion of minority students (see Table
4.8).

Figure 4.6

Scatterplot and fitted line comparing proportion of Pell grant students to the
proportion of minority students in the undergraduate student population

Notes: Pearson’s correlation = .715, which is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
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Table 4.8 provides the parallel correlations between the proportions of Pell grant
(or low-income) students and the proportions of minority students to the same variables
in the study. Although the significant correlations generally seem to follow similar trends,
the impact is not the same for low-income and minority students. The cost of education
for low-income students had no significant relationship for Pell-grant students, while
costs for low-income students were significantly related, but only slightly higher as the
proportion of minority students increased. The only other obvious difference between the
two types of indicators is that SACSCOC is negatively associated with Pell-grant
students while positively associated with minority students; neither correlation is
significant, however. For the rest of the correlations, proportions of Pell-grant students
provide a different perspective from proportions of minority students. Both variables are
included in the models for this study.
Table 4.8

Comparison of Pearson’s correlation between proportions of Pell-grant
students and proportions of minority students against other predictors

Graduation rate
Cost of attendance
Cost of attendance for low-income students
Efficiency subscore
Effectiveness subscore
SACSCOC
** p < .01 * p < .05

Proportions of
Pell-grant students
-.707**
-.338**
-.029
.04
-.360**
-.043

Proportions of
minority students
-.474**
-.128**
.08*
-.068
-.204**
.027

As accrediting leaders, such as Dr. Wheelan and Dr. Elgart (2016), have asserted,
policymakers assume that graduation rates equate to effectiveness, and that an
institution’s performance can be solely measured by a single variable. A comparison
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between graduation rates and the effectiveness subscore do support the assumption that a
positive relationship exists between graduation rates and effectiveness. The Pearson’s
correlation between the two is 27.4%, which is significant at the .01 level.
As one would expect, higher Pell grant percentages negatively correlate with
effectiveness and have a Pearson’s correlation of -36.0%, which is significantly at the .01
level (see Figure 4.7). These relationships are consistent given the strong negative
relationship between graduation rates and the proportion of Pell grant students.

Figure 4.7

Scatterplot with fitted line comparing graduation rates to the effectiveness
subscore and proportion of Pell grant students to the effectiveness subscore

Notes: Graduation rate and effectiveness subscore: Pearson’s correlation = .274,
significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
Proportion of Pell grant students and effectiveness subscore: Pearson’s correlation =
-.360, significant at the .01 level (2 tailed)
Caution must be taken when relying on graduation rates alone to predict
effectiveness. First, the effectiveness subscore had a weak Crohnbach’s alpha score at
0.46. This subscore consists of input metrics for expenditures as well as outcomes for
accreditation. If one compares the relationship of graduation rates to SACSCOC scores, a
much weaker, but significantly positive correlation can be found with a Pearson’s
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correlation of 8.4%, significant at less than .01. As indicated in Table 4.8, Pell grants and
minority proportions have no significant influence on SACSCOC scores.
More importantly for this research, higher graduation rates, although a potential
signal of effectiveness, are also a signal of low social equity. In other words, institutions
that enroll high-income students have higher graduation rates and may be more effective
than those that have higher proportions of low-income students. If performance continues
to stress higher graduation rates, then institutions that serve low-income students will be
at a disadvantage. A concerning implication that the pressure to increase graduation rates
could incentivize institutions to restrict access for low-income students.
One final caution to mention, these scatterplots indicate relatively weak
relationships and several outliers. Other factors beyond these basic bivariate comparisons
exist, such as institutional characteristics related to control (i.e., public, private, forprofit), Carnegie status (i.e., research, masters, and bachelors), and selectivity (i.e.,
inclusive, selective, and more selective admissions). The EPI analyzed in the first
hypothesis controls for many of these institutional characteristics.
Further analysis suggests that graduation rates have a slightly negative, significant
relationship with the EPI (refer to Figure 4.8). The scatterplot indicates a wide spread in
data points, which again suggests that other factors are needed to provide a stronger
relationship. On the other hand, the proportion of Pell grant students has a slightly
positive, significant relationship with the EPI. With correlations this small, more
influences are needed to better predict an institution’s EPI than its graduation rate and
proportion of Pell-grant students.
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Scatterplot with fitted line comparing graduation rates to the EPI and
proportion of Pell grant students to the EPI

Notes: Graduation rate and EPI: Pearson’s correlation = -.171, significant at the .01 level
(2-tailed)
Proportion of Pell-grant students and EPI: Pearson’s correlation = .175, significant at the
.01 level (2-tailed)
The results of this second hypothesis and the diagnostic tests all indicate that
graduation rates are a poor measure of institutional success, because they signal
effectiveness for institutions that serve high-income students. The lower the graduation
rate, the more likely that that institution has a mission to educate underrepresented
populations. These findings support a multitude of prior research asserting that
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graduation rates relate more to student and institutional inputs than to educational
effectiveness (Gansemer-Topf & Schuh, 2006; Hamrick et al., 2004; Pike & Graunke,
2015). Rather than develop higher education policies around metrics that misrepresent
institutions that serve an already advantaged population, policymakers could consider the
EPI, which controls for many institutional characteristics associated with students’ socioeconomic status.
Analysis for Hypothesis Three
The third hypothesis compares the EPI to traditional rankings—namely U.S.
News and World Reports (USNWR). The hypothesis states that the EPI would not be
related to U.S. News Ranking, because the traditional models do not account for equity.
Because the SACSCOC variable in the effectiveness score applies only to institutions in
the southeastern region, a national comparison would not necessarily be accurate.
Therefore, the two models included in this section pertain to the regional colleges and
universities that do fall within the SACSCOC purview. Carnegie Classifications of
bachelor’s and master’s loosely distinguish colleges and universities respectively.
Four years of numerical USNWR rankings comprised the independent variable
compared with the EPI score. The regressions including USNWR for the third hypothesis
have mixed results. The rankings have no significant relationship to the EPI scores for
regional universities, but they are significantly related for regional colleges.
The histogram for USNWR for regional universities displays as expected (see
Figure 4.9). The density is skewed to the left, with a preference for the lower USNWR
scores. The lower the score, the higher the rank for USNWR. However, the scatter plot
and fitted line along with a Pearson’s correlation comparing USNWR and EPI scores for
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regional universities indicates a lack of relationship between the two variables (see Figure
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Scatterplot and fitted line comparing USNWR to the EPI score

The regression that compares the EPI to institutional characteristics displayed no
significant influence from Carnegie Classification, selectivity, and USNWR scores (see
Table 4.9). Universities that serve underrepresented populations had significantly higher
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EPI scores, while private and land-grant institutions had significantly lower scores. Forprofit institutions were not included in this model. With an adjusted R-squared of 63.5%,
the model describes more than half of the variance for EPI scores.
Table 4.9

Results to test the relationship between the EPI and U.S. News and World
Report rankings for regional universities

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIF
Constant
195.4991
6.795017
28.77
0.000***
Private
-34.82333
2.023659
-17.21
0.000***
1.17
Master’s
3.191368
6.233799
0.51
0.609
1.07
Inclusive
-1.131194
4.639435
-0.24
0.808
3.02
Selective
-2.469059
2.968147
-0.83
0.407
2.25
Land grant
-29.57645
8.564825
-3.45
0.001**
1.22
Population
25.64574
3.066607
8.36
0.000***
1.28
USNWR rank
.0707193
.0547536
1.29
0.198
2.00
Dependent variable = EPI, N = 204; R2 = 0.6489; Adj. R2 = 0.6364; F (8, 196) = 51.76,
Prob > F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.72; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity = p < 0.2198; Shapiro-Wilk W test: p = 0.15923; Durbin-Watson =
1.0388
***p < .001 ** p < .01

Autocorrelation was the only diagnostic test that warranted further attention. As
indicated in Table 4.9, the EPI model comparing USNWR scores for regional universities
were normal, homoskedastic, and had no multicollinearity. The Durbin-Watson appeared
to indicate autocorrelation, so another TGARCH was needed for this model. The
TGARCH increased the R2 from 64.9% to 72.8%, and the Durbin-Watson moved from
1.0388 to 1.9449 (see Table 4.10). The inferences drawn from the revised model were no
different than the original model. USNWR score had no influence on the EPI. Private and
land-grant institutions had a significantly negative relationship when controlling for
USNWR scores, while institutions serving underrepresented populations had significantly
higher EPI scores.
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Table 4.10

TGARCH comparing EPI and U.S. News and World Report rankings for
regional universities

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
Constant
198.8610
6.8490
29.03
0.000***
Private
-36.1100
1.8588
-19.43
0.000***
Master’s
1.4204
6.3699
0.22
0.824
Inclusive
-0.7287
4.2039
-0.17
0.862
Selective
-3.3676
3.0853
-1.09
0.275
Land grant
-28.0545
8.9817
-3.12
0.002**
Population
25.9920
2.5867
10.05
0.000***
USNWR rank
0.0623
0.0517
1.21
0.228
2
Dependent variable = EPI, N = 204; R = 0.7283; F (8, 196) = 90.0,
Prob > F = 0.000; Durbin-Watson = 1.9449
***p < .001 ** p < .01

In the same model for regional colleges, the constant reflected public, bachelor’s
institutions with very selective admissions. The histogram for USNWR for regional
college reflects similar findings as with regional universities with a density skewed to the
left (see Figure 4.11). The scatter plot and fitted line comparing USNWR and EPI scores
for regional colleges indicates even looser, negative association than for regional
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Scatterplot and fitted line comparing EPI to USNWR scores for regional
colleges

As indicated by the scatterplot, USNWR rankings are significantly, negatively
related to EPI scores (see Table 4.11). Because the scale for USNWR favors institutions
with lower scores, a negative coefficient for regional colleges does imply that USNWR
rank relates to EPI scores. Private colleges in most of the analyses in this study have
significantly lower EPI scores, while institutions that serve underrepresented populations
have significantly higher EPI scores, even when controlling for USNWR scores.
However, this model has a lower adjusted R2 at 47.9% and a much lower sample size
than any of the others in this overall study. Research, land-grant, and for-profit
institutions were excluded from the model, and selective institutions were dropped
because of collinearity.
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Table 4.11

Results to test the relationship between the EPI and U.S. News and World
Report rankings for regional colleges

Variable
Coef.
Std. Error
t
P>|t|
VIF
Constant
224.6697
6.362825
35.31
0.000***
Private
-47.01936
5.900368
-7.97
0.000***
1.08
Master’s
26.06011
14.70634
1.77
0.080
1.05
Inclusive
-5.18526
4.991142
-1.04
0.302
1.40
Population
18.39235
6.400332
2.87
0.005**
1.20
USNWR rank -.2888735
.1311743
-2.20
0.030*
1.37
2
2
Dependent variable = EPI, N = 90; R = 0.5082; Adj. R = 0.4793; F (5, 85) = 17.57,
Prob > F = 0.000; mean VIF = 1.22; Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity: p = 0.1755; Shapiro-Wilk W: p = 0.04284; Durbin-Watson = 0.8334
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05

As with the first two hypotheses, diagnostic tests indicate non-normality and
autocorrelation; however, the model appears to be homoskedastic and has no
mulicollinearity. The interquartile range does not indicate any outliers, whether mild or
severe. Another TGARCH addresses the shortcomings of the original model for regional
colleges. After the TGARCH, the R2 moved from 50.8% to 68.2%, and the DurbinWatson score moved from 0.8334 to 1.8977. The revised model also corrects for
normality. Interestingly, the TGARCH output was exactly the same as the original model
displayed in Table 4.11, meaning that no further treatment is needed for the model
depicting regional colleges in this dataset.
The mixed results for the third hypothesis make the comparison between the EPI
and USNWR rankings inconclusive. Up to 72 institutions were categorized as regional
universities, but only 22 institutions were included in the regional college models. That
leaves 101 institutions with no comparable USNWR ranking. These low sample numbers
make generalizability difficult. Furthermore, because institutions with social equity
missions, particularly those with inclusive admissions practices, are excluded from
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USNWR rankings, the EPI provides a more encompassing accountability measure that
applies to broader types of institutions.
Much prior research warns about using academic rankings as a basis for
evaluating educational effectiveness. For example, Kuh and Pascarella (2004) assert that
these rankings merely measure an institution’s selectivity in admissions and not
necessarily the association with sound educational practices. These authors strongly
suggest the development of alternative indicators of effective practices. Furthermore,
other critics warn of the adverse repercussions associated with rising through academics
ranks. Researchers such as Meredith (2004) and Bastedo and Bowman (2009, 2010,
2011) found negative implications for socioeconomic and racial demographics. By
controlling for institutional characteristics associated with socioeconomic and racial
demographics, the EPI minimizes the adverse effects on institutions with social equity
missions, and the newly developed instrument allows for the inclusion of effective
educational practices.
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CONCLUSIONS
This study developed an alternative accountability instrument for higher
education that combines measures related to efficiency, equity, and effectiveness, called
the Education Performance Index (EPI). Although graduation rates and related efficiency
metrics do have a purpose in accountability, they portray a narrow perspective of
institutional performance often more related to an institution’s characteristics than its
educational efforts. The EPI was applied to 195 institutions in the southeastern region
across four years.
The results of this study support the first hypothesis that institutions with social
equity missions would not have significantly lower scores than their counterparts. Adding
dimensions for equity and effectiveness diminishes the influence that institutional
characteristics have on accountability measures. The EPI provides a more comprehensive
picture of accountability that efficiency measures alone.
An analysis of the EPI upholds the second hypothesis and prior literature, which
asserts that performance in terms of graduation rates favor institutions with more
selective admissions criteria and fewer low-income and underrepresented students (e.g.,
Hamrick et al., 2004; Mettler, 2014; Pascarella et al., 2006). Institutional characteristics
comprise 57.8% of the variation in graduation rates as depicted in Table 4.4. Those
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institutions with social equity missions have significantly lower graduation rates than
their counterparts.
Finally, comparisons between the EPI and traditional rankings as measured by
U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) partially supported the third hypothesis.
Because the accreditation metric in this study is regionally based, the national universities
and national liberal arts rankings could not be used in the comparison. Regional
universities saw no significant relationship between the EPI and USNWR rankings, but
regional colleges did have a significant negative, albeit small, relationship between the
scores and the rankings. This last finding would seem as though traditional rankings
would be indicative of institutional performance for small colleges; however this
hypothesis excludes 101 (51.8%) institutions because they had did not have any or had
national USNWR rankings. Therefore, the EPI has broader applications than traditional
rankings alone.
Several unique dimensions separate the EPI from prior performance metrics. The
three subcategories of the EPI help shift the focus away from institutional characteristics.
Using the EPI score, institutions with social equity missions would be less likely to
experience adverse effects that might result from evaluations based on efficiency
measures alone. Finally, by allowing the results of accreditation to inform the
effectiveness score, the performance index incorporates some educational outcomes
along with the traditional inclusion of institutional inputs and outputs.
Discussion
This study demonstrates Ostrom and colleagues’ (1961) idea of polycentricism
with multiple types of missions forming the centricities. These missions offer institutional
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characteristics, often overlapping one another. As this study asserts, mission-related
characteristics can influence an institution’s performance, making the college or
university more or less efficient. Applying a single-focused accountability model based
on efficiency would encourage monocentric university missions. Nevertheless, colleges
and universities cannot be excused from accountability standards. The EPI provides
additional means by which institutions can be evaluated so as to preserve the variety of
missions and institutional diversity. On the other hand, too much focus on individual
missions could encourage public choice tendencies, which also has homogenizing effects
on institutional diversity as the result of increased competition and academic drift (e.g.,
Harris, 2013; Morphew, 2009; Riesman, 1958). Therefore, the educational outcomes
identified by the federal government also remain a part of the overall model.
Historically, institutions in the southeast have performed below many other
institutions in the country, as indicated by the relatively low number of southeastern
institutions in the national U.S. News and World Report rankings (U.S. News and World
Report, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). The results of this research support the same trend with
an average graduation rate of 46.9%. Furthermore, institutions with social equity
missions had significantly lower graduation rates than their counterparts (refer to Table
4.4). As described in chapter 3, the highest proportion of institutions with social equity
missions are located in the southeastern region, which could also explain why the
institutional averages appear low when compared against the rest of the nation. However,
the southeastern region has some of the most diverse populations as well as some of the
most need for social equity missions. Regardless, the results of this study suggest that
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efficiency scores are highly related to institutional characteristics, which discourages
institutions that are not large, public, research entities.
Many researchers assert that graduation rates are measures of inputs to outputs
and would therefore be classified as an efficiency indicator (Archibald & Feldman,
2008b; Hamrick et al., 2004; Mettler, 2014). However, in keeping with Okun’s (1975)
concern for the trade-off between equity and efficiency, placing graduation rates and
other equity indicators in the same subscore supports a social equity continuum. The
efficiency subscore can then focus on financial considerations for students and
institutions, which also directly responds to policymakers’ concerns about the rising costs
and expenses associated with higher education.
By controlling for factors related to social equity, then institutions that are truly
underperforming could be differentiated from those that are underperforming as a result
of their institutional characteristics. Rather than make excuses for those institutions that
they are unduly penalized for their institutional characteristics, the EPI begins to help
demonstrate whether these institutions are truly fulfilling their missions, which may
satisfy critics of accreditation (e.g., Crow, 2009). In this study, inclusive institutions and
private institutions still generally seem to perform below the others, but not all of them
perform badly.
Finally, the EPI is not a ranking, so it does not promote competition among
institutions. Although a few of the measures are percentile ranks, those pertain to
financial ratios that are difficult to measure without greater context with comparisons to
other institutions. Furthermore, these percentiles help adjust for fluctuations in the
economy and when such a large number of institutions are included in the index, then the
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elite institutions with large endowments cannot skew the results. With the EPI,
institutions do not have to forgo their social equity missions in order to remain
accountable using traditional measures. Instead, they could continue to focus on what
they do best in serving the underrepresented populations, while others continue to serve a
select few. This last statement justifies the continued support for rankings, such as
USNWR, because some families and employers would like to see differentiation of elite
institutions from all the others. However, if governments were to adopt a performance
metric that supports all types of missions, then traditional measures, such as USNWR,
become less threatening to those institutions with social equity missions.
Addition of SACSCOC as a measure
Incorporating the accreditation results provides a peer-reviewed mechanism by
which to evaluate institutions beyond comparing the relationship of inputs to outputs. The
accreditation process emphasizes the importance of institutional practices in accordance
with the school’s mission with a high tolerance for institutional diversity and social
equity (Wheelan & Elgart, 2016). As Bardo (2009) and Crow (2009) acknowledged, no
other system in the world compares to the unique American version of assuring
educational effectiveness.
Accrediting agencies are not perfect measures of effectiveness, however, and peer
reviews can be as flawed as narrow performance agenda. Although based on theoretically
defined practices of effective education, accreditation standards still rely on proxies and
inputs to measure student learning (e.g., number of faculty to support the missions,
faculty qualifications, appropriate student support services). These standards put more
emphasis on quality assurance and processes than on true learning outcomes (Kuh &
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Ewell, 2010; Wergin, 2005). SACSCOC in particular has begun focusing its principles on
improvement and aspirational goals, which moves away from inputs and processes.
Not all accreditation supporters would favor the incorporation of this indicator in
the EPI (Eaton, Fryshman, Hope, Scanlon, & Crow, 2005). For one, the agencies would
have to concede to greater transparency in reaffirmation decisions. Many fear that
disclosing accreditation results would damage the bonds of trust between institutions and
the peer reviewers. As a result, agencies would find difficulty in convincing volunteers to
participate if the volunteers felt threatened by potential negative action. Accreditation
documents may be authored by public relations personnel rather than academic
administrators and faculty. Institutions may feel pressure not to undergo an honest selfassessment for fear of being found non-compliant. Furthermore, review committee
members may not be comfortable giving public criticism of an institution for fear of
retaliation or even potential legal action.
On the other hand, many of these concerns may be unfounded. Public institutions
often publish their self-study documents publically, and many would make the reports
from the accrediting agency available upon request. Institutions share best practices with
one another and discuss the details of the committee findings. Furthermore, committee
members cannot hide behind anonymity when examining the institution, and must
exercise diplomacy when authoring the results of their reviews.
For accreditation to remain credible as the educational effectiveness and quality
experts, more of the process, albeit not every detail, would have to become transparent.
This openness would also be imperative for the EPI to have meaning to external
constituencies. Regardless of these criticisms, many would agree that accreditation
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evaluates higher education institutions differently than the government, and these
standards provide a different perspective to performance. Not all efficient institutions
have high SACSCOC scores, and many with low graduation rates may still be effectively
educating their students. Incorporating accrediting bodies in measures of performance
provides a broader form of accountability, and gives institutions more voice in these
measures.
Impact based on institutional control
Although the EPI controlled for social equity missions, institutional control was
the only institutional characteristic that consistently showed significance. Private nonprofit institutions have much lower EPI scores than anticipated. Most likely, the
relationship is related to financial variables: cost of attendance, cost of attendance for
low-income students, and the rate at which students default on those loans are all higher
for private non-profit institutions than for public institutions. Affordability has risen in
prominence in accountability structures (The White House, 2012, 2014), and a model that
excluded these factors would not appease federal legislators. The recent closures that
have been announced have all been small, private non-profit institutions, and several
editorial pieces in prominent higher education newspapers (e.g., Biemiller, 2016;
Wootton, 2016) speculate whether these small colleges can survive in the current era of
accountability. Furthermore, the most recent negative actions against four-year
institutions from SACSCOC were directed at five institutions, all of which were small,
private non-profit institutions and as a result of financial instability (SACSCOC, 2016, p.
8).
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For-profit institutions could not be effectively compared in this research. Only six
for-profit institutions could be included in this study, which is too small of a sample size
upon which to base conclusions. Although many more exist within the SACSCOC
region, most have incomplete IPEDS data and could not be incorporated into the EPI. In
fact, across the for-profit sector, only 66 for-profit institutions were in the IPEDS
universe and were classified as four-year, degree-granting, Title IV accepting. Of those
66, 23 (34.8%) had regional accreditation, and the rest held national accreditation, mostly
from the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools. These facts were
gathered by downloading the accreditation data files from the Office of Postsecondary
Education (2016), entering those institutions into the IPEDS Data Center (National
Center for Education Statistics, 2015), and comparing the institutional characteristics.
Despite the low sample size, the for-profits were not completely excluded from
this study because future research must allow for their inclusion. These institutions must
be evaluated in the same manner as the non-profit institutions if all sectors of higher
education are called to demonstrate their accountability. For-profit institutions collect
over $1 billion in federal financial aid from public funding (Mettler, 2014), and yet, their
performance trails non-profit institutions. According to College Board (2013), 12% of all
postsecondary full-time equivalent students were enrolled at for-profit institutions;
however, these institutions received 21% of Pell Grant funds, 21% of both direct
subsidized and unsubsidized loans, and 37% of Post-9/11 GI Bill funds (p. 19).
Furthermore, 43% of for-profit students who entered repayment defaulted by September
2012, compared to 10% of all federal student loan borrowers in the nation (p. 4).
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These for-profit institutions would argue that they provide education to an
underrepresented student population, which is true. In this study, four of the for-profit
institutions operated with inclusive admissions practices, meeting one of the definitions
of social equity missions. However, 25 public institutions and 30 private non-profit
institutions also offered inclusive admissions practices, and these institutions scored
significantly higher in the EPI than their for-profit counterparts.
Regardless of these facts, care should be taken when attempting to generalize the
conclusions of this study to the broader for-profit sector, particularly when so few input
data into the IPEDS database. More research is warranted to further develop the
indicators to accommodate special institutions, especially those classified as for-profit.
Implications for Higher Education Policy
Despite the criticisms of New Public Management, the accountability trends have
intensified rather than subsided. Performance-based agenda, particularly those based on
quantifiable data, are not leaving the policy arena (Kelly & Rivenbark, 2003; McLendon
et al., 2006; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). As authors such as Dougherty and
colleagues (2012) and McLendon and colleagues (2006a) have noted, state governments
enact performance funding systems, watch those systems fail, wait for a period of time
until another major election, and then reinstate performance-based decisions.
One of the primary reasons researchers have found as to why performance-based
initiatives fail has to do with lack of involvement among all constituents, lack of trust
with the government, and an unwillingness to forgo institutional missions, particularly
those missions focused on social equity, for the sake of efficiency (Dougherty et al.,
2012). The EPI addresses these types of short-comings that prior performance-centered
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policies have not considered. The implications for this research affect the federal
government, accrediting agencies, academic ranking publications, as well as potentially
other public entities or policy systems.
Implications of the EPI for the federal government
Federal leaders and policymakers have long awaited a quantifiable metric for
evaluating the higher education system; however, these desires are met with staunch
resistance, particularly from higher education institutions themselves. These debates will
continue with the EPI, however, as indicated by the current discussions over a higher
education cost index. The EPI contains measures for graduation rates, default rates,
tuition rates, and loan burdens, which all comprise the central concerns for the federal
government (Duncan, 2015; Mitchell, 2016).
Legislators and agents might prefer national standards to further quantify student
learning, but numerous critics have pointed out the flaws with one-size-fits-all measures,
particularly for public entities or those that serve the public good (e.g., Harris, 2013;
Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002). On one hand, quality assurance promises to ensure
effective learning, but on the other hand, focusing on evaluating the present day and
maintaining basic measures does not encourage innovation or aspirational goals
(Anderson, 2006; Barton, 2010; Ewell, 2008). Furthermore, the standard assessment
instruments for evaluating student learning are flawed, causing biases in the results not
related to what knowledge students do or do not possess (Ewell, 2008; Steedle et al.,
2010). Faculty-developed rubrics are available through the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP); however, their application to student artifacts remains
inconsistent and non-comparable across institutions (Jonsson & Svingby, 2007; Kuh &
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Ewell, 2010). As education leaders have suggested, the accreditation process helps
address educational effectiveness with tolerance for institutional diversity (Crow, 2009;
Wheelan & Elgart, 2016).
The federal government may not approve of the methods that accrediting bodies
use to evaluate institutions (e.g., Mitchell, 2016, p. 8), but to achieve greater buy-in, more
input is needed from other perspectives. As Crow (2009) has written, no other viable
option has emerged to replace the accreditation process. He writes that the federal
government has a narrow perspective on the role and purpose of accreditation, and the
government may have to concede to the inclusion of accreditation outcomes.
Implications of the EPI for accrediting agencies
The implications of the EPI for accrediting agencies may alleviate some of the
anxieties of these organizations, but may also add to those concerns. On one hand, the
EPI allows accreditation to continue mostly unchanged as a method that encourages selfevaluation and peer-evaluation. These evaluations can be relative to the institutions’
missions and can incorporate whatever assessment instruments deemed appropriate for
the student body—whether qualitative or quantitative. On the other hand, in exchange for
greater involvement in determining institutional performance, these agencies will also
have to make some concessions.
The biggest point of contention for accrediting bodies would be allowing for
greater transparency in the reaffirmation process. Complete confidentiality would prevent
the accreditation score from being used in the EPI—unless the effectiveness score were
presented to the public in an aggregate form. That is not to say that everything in
accreditation would have to be open to public viewing, such as the off-site and on-site
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reports. But perhaps the accreditation results could be more informative beyond public
statements indicating an institution’s continued accreditation or negative actions for
cause. More conversations with accreditation and institutional leaders would have to
occur before an accreditation metric could be added to a performance instrument.
One trend that has already begun to take place within SACSCOC involves a shift
from quality assurance toward improved outcomes. Quality assurance focuses on the
present state of programs, ensuring that certain benchmarks are achieved and reports are
completed, while improvement focuses on future outcomes to reach an ideal (Wergin,
2005). As Brittingham (2009) described, accreditation has become less prescriptive and
more future-oriented, so that institutions can be more aspirational in their ideals for
student learning rather than focused strictly on process. This evolution involves greater
training and information about the nature of evaluating student learning outcomes.
Ewell (2008) examined the extent to which the nation’s institutions have initiated
outcomes assessment activities and found that accreditation drives these exercises.
Without the emphasis from accrediting bodies, institutions would not be justifying what
their students know or do not know to the same extent. However, he and Kuh (2010)
collaborated to evaluate the current student learning assessment practices, and found that
much of what institutions are doing could not be called outcomes assessment because
academic programs are not learning from the process what they could do better. But
institutions also need the freedom to fail as long as they can justify how this failure leads
to improvement in educational practices, and they need for the results of the assessment
not to be tied directly to high-stakes performance agenda. Furthermore, not all accrediting
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agencies require student learning outcomes to the same extent as others, and an
unevenness is apparent in national assessment practices.
Finally, regional and national accreditation standards vary in a way that would
make comparability difficult. These organizations would have to work together to
identify which themes demonstrate effective educational practices. These standards
would not have to be stated the same across all agencies and the methods of evaluation
would not necessarily have to be applied exactly the same, but these agencies would need
to agree on which aspects of education best exhibit effectiveness.
Implications of the EPI for academic ranking publications
Generating an educational performance index would not likely threaten the
market for academic rankings, such as U.S. News and World Report. Ample research
exists to suggest that regardless of all of the information and data available to the public,
prospective students and their families continue to rely on these rankings to inform their
decisions (e.g., Bastedo & Bowman, 2010; Hossler, 2000; Meredith, 2004). Furthermore,
the EPI neither ranks nor identifies elite institutions, which are features of these types of
publications and are in demand from potential students.
The EPI would not only fail to replace academic rankings, but it would also not
prevent institutions from competing with one another in the rankings or for high-ability
students. Rather, its intended purpose is to minimize pressures from performance-based
policies that could adversely affect institutions with social equity missions. Although
these rankings have their place and will continue to have a role in helping distinguish the
most efficient institutions, the hope would be that neither the federal government nor the
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accrediting agencies would ascribe too much value to competitive rankings that are
heavily influenced by institutional characteristics and mission-based attributes.
Potential implications for other public services
With the incorporation of equity, the EPI has implications for other public
services as well, which also face pressures for accountability in quantifiable manners.
These entities would have to identify measures of efficiency, equity, and effectiveness
and weigh them so that they form a sort of balanced scorecard. More work is needed in
developing measures of effectiveness; however, equity measures could be available for
other services.
Recommendations for Further Research
More research is needed to develop the EPI into a viable accountability
instrument. In particular, more input is needed from higher education leaders,
accreditation leaders, and policy experts. The effectiveness objective will need
cooperation among the accrediting bodies in the country, because all other data have been
standardized regardless of institutions’ locations. This coordination will allow the EPI to
expand beyond the southeastern region and provide even more data from which to draw
conclusions. Aside from fostering dialogue among the many stakeholders, some other
metrics would provide more clarity in the extent to which institutions perform in each of
the subcategories.
First, IPEDS must begin collecting more and better social equity metrics. For
example, a comparison between the gender of the students and faculty, as well as the
race/ethnicity of students compared to the faculty, would provide more insight into how
113

the institutions represent the population. Although some of this information is available
through IPEDS, these data are not required, and most institutions opt not to submit what
is not required. Such metrics could replace the current proxy for proportions of minority
students who graduate, which skews equity measures toward institutions that serve
minority populations.
Second, metrics pertaining to low-income students would also assist in evaluating
social equity. If the conclusions of Carnevale and Rose (2003) and others are correct that
race/ethnicity differs from family income, then the EPI will need to accommodate those
differences. The U.S. Department of Education (2006) recognizes that not all low-income
students receive Pell grants, and in the absence of an identifier for low-income status, the
proportion of Pell grants must serve as a proxy. Similarly, institutions must calculate and
submit graduation rates disaggregated by gender and race/ethnicity; therefore, a
graduation rate for students who receive Pell grants is also needed. Furthermore, it would
be more telling to be able to combine all or none of these student attributes when
comparing graduation rates, so institutions could track minority females versus males and
so forth.
Another metric not included in the EPI but could be incorporated relates to
distance education. IPEDS provides a few variables related to online or correspondence
courses, but only in categorical format, so the magnitude to which distance education
influences EPI scores could not be determined.
More research could also help explain some of the fluctuations in EPI scores for
institutional control. What aspects of these different affiliations causes differences?
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Could some of the differences be controlled for in calculating the EPI or should they be
controlled?
More research is needed to explore within each institutional mission where the
weaknesses and strengths are. Studying how institutions could improve their scores
would provide more insight into performance. More investigations on equity and
effectiveness are warranted for validation. Why are the equity subscores so low for the
southeast, which has the highest proportion of institutions with social equity missions in
the country? For example, could an institution simply begin admitting more minority or
low-income students in an effort to raise its EPI score? Could better measures prevent
institutions from gaming the data, or is data manipulation an inevitability whenever
performance has high-stakes implications?
The lack of measurable student learning data remains a national dilemma.
Although SACSCOC accreditation does begin to address student learning, not all of the
regional and national accrediting bodies feature equivalent practices. Critics also lament
the poor state of those student learning outcomes within the regions, including the
southeast. Further investigation on best practices in evaluating student learning would
help inform this aspect of accountability.
Finally, the policy arena surrounding higher education continues to evolve.
SACSCOC has already begun discussions about further modifications to its principles.
The EPI will have to identify educational themes that would apply to multiple accrediting
agencies and be flexible enough not to be effected by occasional adjustments to the
agencies’ principles. Continuity in EPI calculations despite adjustments within variables
is achievable as evidenced by the numerous scoring changes in academic rankings,
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standardized testing, and even national outcomes. The EPI will need to remain dynamic
and conversations remain ongoing for the instrument to be current to societal needs.
Limitations
Several limitations prevent the EPI from being generalizable or replicable for all
higher education institutions. The primary limitation pertains to the restriction of data to
the southeastern region of the country. Before the EPI could be considered for other
regions, the initial sample using the SACSCOC data would test the necessity for the
metric. The presence of SACSCOC as a variable does provide a unique perspective to the
conclusions of the EPI. In this study, institutional missions accounted for less than 15%
of the variance within accreditation scores. If the accreditation score had not had a
significant impact on the overall EPI or if the other effectiveness measures accurately
portrayed accreditation results, then the study would not need to involve the other
accrediting agencies.
The institutions in the study were limited even within the southeastern area.
Because accreditation standards changed in 2008, comparable data were not available
prior to fall 2009. Therefore, several hundred four-year institutions within the SACSCOC
purview were excluded from the study. However, those that were included in the study
were representative of the various types of institutional characteristics (with the exception
of for-profits, which are limited even within the entire population) of the region.
The accreditation data featured only the results of the on-site committee’s review.
Due to constraints in resources, collecting data for off-site, on-site, and Board of
Trustees’ reviews would have been difficult. In conversations with the staff at
SACSCOC, it was settled that data from the on-site would have to serve as a starting
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point for discussion. For the accreditation data to be even more meaningful, the entire
accreditation process would have to be incorporated.
Finally, the lack of measurable student learning data remains a barrier in
accurately evaluating American institutions. Without knowing the value added in the
knowledge attainment at bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral levels, the other metrics seem
ancillary to the true outcomes of higher education. Although SACSCOC accreditation
does address student learning, institutions within the region represent an unevenness in
the degree to which schools measure that learning. As SACSCOC transitions away from
the input and process focus to more aspirational outcome-related approaches, these
assessment standards may be proxies to student learning.
Summary
The higher education system represents a polycentric approach to providing a
good that benefits society. Institutions of higher education offer multiple missions,
providing different entry points and different programs in which to attain postsecondary
credentials. These multiple missions form the system’s centricities. No one institution
could serve all populations, and likewise, no one evaluation approach could measure
every institution’s success. Much research exists to indicate that in the current
performance-driven era of accountability informed by theories related to New Public
Management, higher education policies emphasize efficiency measures, such as
graduation rates and default rates, as indicators of institutional success. Institutions with
missions that seek to advance social equity are often adversely affected by performance
targets that feature efficiency alone. This research developed an Educational Performance
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Index—a tool that combines measures of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity—to serve
as an evaluation instrument for higher education institutions.
The factor analysis substantiates the indicators and groups of indicators into the
three domains of accountability. When all of the traditionally associate performance
metrics were examined, ten of them proved to be the most relevant to the overall purpose
of evaluation.
The results of the study indicated that social equity related missions do have a
negative relationship to traditional performance metrics, and if educational policies
continue to emphasize these metrics, then these institutions would be at a disadvantage.
The composite EPI was not influenced by institutional characteristics, such as Carnegie
Classification and attributes indicative of social equity missions. By controlling for these
mission-related features, institutional performance can be measured more
comprehensively. The introduction of social equity measures into the EPI leaves room for
the collection of more appropriate metrics, such as identifiers for low-income students,
minority faculty, and disaggregated graduation rates for Pell grant students.
This EPI does not constitute a “silver bullet” approach to evaluating higher
education institutions. More work is needed to develop a nation-wide effectiveness
objective. The limitations of incongruous accreditation standards across the country as
well as limited student learning measures make the EPI a work in progress. However, the
relationship between efficiency and equity does provide promising evidence that the EPI
addresses the disparity among institutional missions. The work of this study contributes
not only to the preservation of the many centricities in higher education (also known as
institutional diversity), but it also supports Frederickson’s (2005, 2010) call for better
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incorporation of social equity considerations in public policy. With more research in the
measures and dialogue among education leaders and policymakers, the EPI could address
some of the fundamental challenges to the need and desire for performance-based
policies that do not disincentivize institutions from serving the public good.
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University of Georgia
University of Kentucky
University of Mary Hardin-Baylor
University of Mary Washington
University of Memphis
University of Mobile
University of Montevallo
University of New Orleans
University of North Alabama
University of North Carolina at Asheville
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
University of North Carolina Wilmington
University of Pikeville
University of South Alabama
University of South Carolina-Aiken
University of South Carolina-Columbia
University of South Carolina-Upstate
University of South Florida-Main Campus
University of South Florida-St Petersburg
University of St Thomas
University of the Incarnate Word
University of West Alabama
University of West Georgia
Virginia Commonwealth University
Voorhees College
Warner University
Warren Wilson College
Welch College
Wesleyan College
Western Kentucky University
Wiley College
William Peace University
Winthrop University
Xavier University of Louisiana
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Institutional Characteristics (centricities)

Characteristic
Institutional Control

Source

Code
1 = public, non-profit
2 = private, non-profit
3 = private, for-profit
Carnegie
IPEDS
0 = Special focus institutions
Classification
(theological seminaries, health
profession schools, schools of art,
music, and design) (Basic: 24-30)
1 = Associate’s (Basic: 3-14)
2 = Bachelor’s (Basic: 21-23)
3 = Master’s (Basic: 18-20)
4 = Research (Basic: 15-17)
Carnegie
IPEDS
1 = Inclusive (Profile: 1-6, 9)*
Undergraduate Profile
2 = Selective (Profile: 7-8, 10-11)
3 = More selective (Profile: 12-13)
Land grant
IPEDS
0 = not a land grant
1 = land grant *
Population
IPEDS (historically black 0 = serves a general population
colleges and universities 1 = serves at least one of the
& tribal colleges)
underrepresented populations *
AAPIACU (Asian &
Pacific Islander)
HACU (Hispanic)
WCC (Women’s)
* indicates social equity mission
IPEDS
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Index metrics and indicators

Raw Data

Metric

Source

Indicator
Conversion

Efficiency subscore
Cost of attendance

Same as raw data

Cost of attendance for low- Same as raw data
income students
Average loan amount
Loan as a proportion of
total cost = (average loan
Cost of attendance
amount / cost of
attendance) * 100
Equity subscore
Graduation rate
Same as raw data
Pell-grant students
Same as raw data
Student default rate
Same as raw data
Number of bachelor’s
Proportion of bachelor’s
degrees awarded
degrees to minority
students = 100% –
Number of bachelor’s
(degrees to white students
degrees awarded to white / total number of degrees)
students

IPEDS
IPEDS
IPEDS

IPEDS
IPEDS
FSA
IPEDS

Percentile rank of
metric
Percentile rank of
metric
Percentile rank of
metric

Same as metric
Same as metric
100% – default rate
Same as metric

Effectiveness subscore
Accreditation results of 18
standards, coded as 1 if in
compliance or 0 if not in
compliance
Institutional support
expenditures
 GASB (public)
 FASB (private & some
public)
 For-profit

SACSCOC grade = (sum SACSCOC Same as metric
of standards in
compliance / 18) * 100
Administrative
expenditures =
(institutional support /
(total expenditures –
hospital expenditures) *
100)

Hospital expenditures
Total expenditures
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IPEDS

Percentile rank of
metric

Raw Data
Instructional expenses
Academic support
expenses
Student support expenses

Metric

Source

Mission-related expenses IPEDS
= ((instructional +
academic support +
student support +
research + outreach) /
(total – hospital))*100

Research expenses
Outreach expenses
Hospital expenses
Total expenses
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Indicator
Conversion
Same as metric

